Middle East Economic Survey
VOL. LIII
No 7
15
POLITICAL COMMENT
Political Comment(15 February 2010)
In Iraq, the battle over the disqualification of allegedly Ba'thist candidates is threatening to inflame sectarian tensions ahead of next month's parliamentary elections. Yemen's government has reached agreement on a ceasefire with Houthi insurgents on the north of the country. The anniversary of Iran's Islamic revolution passed without a major confrontation between the authorities and the reformist opposition. Further sanctions are being considered following the latest salvo of contradictory statements from the Iranians about their nuclear intentions.
Battle Over Candidates Continues In Iraq
It would probably be an understatement to describe the situation in Iraq in the run-up to the 7 March parliamentary elections as confused. First, the Justice and Accountability Commission (JAC) - the body overseeing de-Ba'thification - disqualified a reported 500 candidates in mid-January. Next, on 2 February, the High Election Commission (HEC) reportedly overturned the JAC's decision. Five days later an "Iraqi appeals panel" was reported to have partially reversed the HEC move by deciding to review only the cases of the 177 candidates who appealed the JAC decision (rather than all 500). And finally, on 9 February the panel of seven judges empowered to review the bans of individual candidates - which may or may not be coterminous with the HEC - reportedly announced that of the 766 candidates originally banned, all but 177 had already been removed from the ballot by their parties and that 140 of these 177 had filed their appeals improperly, leaving only 37 banned candidates whose cases were eligible for review.
Murky as the situation remains - even the names of the banned candidates do not appear to have been made public - two things are clear: firstly, the gloves are coming off as the election draws closer; and secondly, the controversy over the JAC's decision is inflaming sectarian tensions. For example, Baghdad provincial governor Salah 'Abd al-Razzaq, a senior member of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's Da'wa party - which is nominally secular but presently aligned with the Shi'a Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq (ISCI) - told protesters on 7 February that "we should not stand with our hands tied during this sensitive period. We should take revenge for our martyrs, prisoners, the displaced and homeless left by the former regime…We will de-Ba'thify the Baghdad administration." On the other side of the divide, former prime minister 'Ayad 'Allawi, the Shi'a leader of the secular Iraqiya list, was even more apocalyptic, warning on 8 February that the ban on candidates "will lead to severe sectarian tensions…this will put Iraq in the box of sectarianism and the route to civil war."
Truce In Yemen
On 11 February both the Yemeni government and the Houthi insurgents in Sa'da province in the north of the country announced a ceasefire ending the latest round of fighting between them, which began last August when President 'Ali 'Abd Allah Salih accused the Houthis of "refusal to adhere to the peace option announced by the government a year ago." A government statement broadcast on state media declared that "we decided to stop military operations in the northwest region starting from midnight tonight. This is to stop the bloodshed and bring peace to the northwest region and to return the displaced to their villages." On the rebel side the leader of the insurgency, 'Abd al-Malik al-Houthi, announced in a statement that he had "issued instructions to all fronts and fighting sites to stop firing coinciding with the timing announced by the government." It remains to be seen whether the latest agreement, which involves a number of joint committees to oversee various aspects of the truce, will put a definitive end to the fighting, which has been going on sporadically since 2004. But it does leave the government free, for the moment at least, to focus its attention on two other sizable problems - the separatist movement in the south of the country and the activities of al-Qa'ida's Yemeni subsidiary, al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula.
Islamic Revolution Anniversary In Tehran
In the run-up to the anniversary of the Islamic revolution on 11 February the Iranian authorities outdid themselves in trumpeting Iran's indigenous defense capabilities. On 6 February the government inaugurated production lines for the Qaem anti-helicopter missile and Toofan-5 anti-armor missile. The next day the Fars News Agency reported that an Iranian stealth aircraft had been test flown and had "completed all the radar evading characteristics considered by us." And on 8 February a senior air force officer told the IRNA news agency that "in the near future a new locally-made air defense system will be unveiled by the country's experts and scientists which is as powerful as the S-300 missile defense system" - Russia's finest - "or even stronger." These claims were presumably intended to whip up nationalist support for the government ahead of an anniversary which the authorities must have feared could have provided a platform for the reformist opposition movement contesting the reelection of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad last June. In the event, however, the potential confrontation failed to develop, and the hard-line backers of the president managed to stage a massive show of support for the authorities, by ensuring the presence of large numbers of pro-government demonstrators, while denying the opposition exposure through a mixture of intimidation, repression and media manipulation.
To Enrich Or Not To Enrich
True to form, after declaring on 2 February that "we have no problem sending our enriched uranium abroad," President Ahmadinejad did what looked like a U-turn five days later when he revealed during a televised speech on 7 February that "I asked Dr Salehi (the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization) to start work on the production of 20% fuel using centrifuges" - and later the same day Dr Salehi announced that "Iran will set up 10 uranium enrichment centers next year" (which in Iran begins on 21 March). In case that proved too unequivocal, however, Dr Salehi insisted on 10 February that the deal with the P5+1 (the US, UK, Russia, France, China and Germany) to send Iran's low-enriched (3.5%) uranium abroad for further fortification "is still on the table," adding that Iran's uranium "can be under the custody of the IAEA in Iran and it could be sealed…until the time we receive the 20% enriched fuel from outside. If they come forward and supply the fuel then we will stop this process of 20% enrichment." Enrichment also featured prominently in Mr Ahmadinejad's speech on the 11 February anniversary of the Islamic revolution. "When we say that we don't build nuclear bombs, it means that we won't do that because we don't believe in having it," he said. "The Iranian nation is brave enough that if one day we wanted to build nuclear bombs we would announce it publicly without being afraid of you. Right now in Natanz we have the capability to enrich to more than 20% and to more than 80%, but because we don't need to, we won't do so."
Unsurprisingly, the upshot of these various pronouncements appears to have been a renewed interest in sanctions amongst the P5+1. German Foreign Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg said on 7 February that "it may be that the sanctions screw needs to be or can be turned here and there…It must be made clear to Iran that patience is at an end." His French counterpart, Bernard Kouchner, opined the next day "this is real blackmail…it's very negative. The only thing that we can do, alas, apply sanctions given that negotiations are not possible." On the same day US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said that "we must still try to find a peaceful way to resolve this issue," but added that "the only path that is left to us at this point, it seems to me, is that pressure track but it will require all of the international community to work together" - and the next day he told Fox News that "I think it is going to take some period of time - I would say weeks, not months - to see if we can't get another UN Security Council resolution." Also on 9 February, the secretary of Russia's presidential Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev, said Iran's actions "raise doubts in other countries and those doubts are quite valid." President Obama, too, indicated that "what we are going to be working on over the next several weeks is developing a significant regime of sanctions that will indicate to them how isolated they are from the international community as a whole…we are going to be looking at a variety of ways in which countries indicate to Iran that their approach is unacceptable." However, one major player, China, was conspicuous by its silence, and Peking's reluctance to impose further sanctions could delay, if not derail, concerted international action, as the French ambassador to the UN, Gerard Araud, warned on 11 February when he said that "it's totally essential to work with the Chinese, even if it means waiting a bit."
Charles Snow