Middle East Economic Survey
VOL. XLVII
No 35
30
The Political Scene (30 August 2004)
Ayatollah Sistani has returned to Najaf and brokered a deal with radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr that stands a very good chance of ending the latter’s confrontation with the Baghdad government and its US backers.
Sistani Comes Home
It has been another week of government threats to evict radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia from the shrine of the Imam ΄Ali in Najaf by force and, on Mr Sadr’s side, anti-American rhetoric alternating with suggestions of a willingness to compromise which somehow never eventuate. (As an example of the former, Defense Minister Hazim al-Sha΄lan declared on 24 August that “we are in the last hours... if Muqtada al-Sadr surrenders, he will be safe and sound. If he resists, the only thing for him is death or prison.” In the latter category were reports on 20 August that Mr Sadr had handed over the keys to the shrine to the office of Iraq’s supreme Shi΄a authority, Ayatollah ΄Ali al-Sistani. After a quiet weekend, Mr Sadr was still in the mosque and fighting resumed in Najaf on 23 August.) However, by 25 August, it began to look as if a denouement favorable to Prime Minister Ayad ΄Allawi might be in the offing. US armored vehicles had reportedly moved to within 20ms of the western gate of the mosque complex. And even Mr Sadr’s spokesman admitted that “the area we control has significantly shrunk,” adding that the Americans “are trying to maintain their control on Najaf because they have failed elsewhere in Iraq.”
It was at this precise juncture that the man conspicuously absent during the three weeks of crisis in Najaf – Ayatollah Sistani himself, who has been in London for medical treatment – decided to make a dramatic return to the scene. On 25 August the ayatollah’s spokesman, Hamad al-Khaffaf, announced that Mr Sistani “is going to return in a few hours to the homeland to save Najaf from disaster… We call on all Iraqis… to prepare to march on Najaf,” adding that “an initiative will be announced when we arrive in Najaf.” Ayatollah Sistani’s motives for this move – he could be trying to preempt, co-opt or even protect Mr Sadr, he could be seeking to emphasize his position at the center of the Iraqi political process, or he could genuinely be trying to mediate a peaceful resolution of the confrontation – can only be guessed at (and are only likely to emerge in retrospect). Whatever the case, on the same day he crossed into Basra from Kuwait, and on 26 August proceeded to Najaf, where the governor, ΄Adnan al-Zurfi, announced that “the government has decided to decree a 24-hour cease fire from Sistani’s arrival in Najaf to secure a protected route between Muqtada al-Sadr’s office and Sistani’s to facilitate talks,” adding that “if there is no agreement after 24 hours, the fighting will resume.” Dr ΄Allawi, for his part, emphasized that “this is our last call for peace and this is the last chance to put an end to the innocent bloodshed.”
On the evening of his arrival in Najaf, the ayatollah’s aides announced that Mr Sadr had accepted a peace plan under which the Mahdi Army forces would leave the Imam ΄Ali shrine by 0600 GMT on 27 August and hand in their weapons; US forces would leave Najaf and hand over responsibility for security to Iraqi police; Najaf would be declared a weapons-free zone; the government would compensate victims of the fighting; and Mr Sadr – for whom an arrest warrant has been issued in connection with the murder of another cleric last year – would go free. At MEES press time on 27 August, therefore, it remained to be seen whether this deal would fare any better than its predecessors, although it seemed highly unlikely that Mr Sadr would choose to take on the ayatollah as well as the government and the Americans. And if Ayatollah Sistani’s intervention does succeed, it will only reinforce his stature as the pivotal player in post-Saddam Iraqi politics.
Charles Snow