Middle East Economic Survey
VOL. XLVII
No 22
The Political Scene (31 May 2004)
The US has submitted a draft resolution on Iraq to the Security Council which threatens to revive familiar differences within the international community. As the 30 June deadline for the transfer of sovereignty approaches, US and British officials have been trying – without much success - to explain the relationship between the interim Iraqi government and coalition forces. A deal has been reached to end the confrontation in Najaf between the Americans and Muqtada al-Sadr.
US Draft Resolution On Iraq
Apart from endorsing “the formation of a sovereign interim government of Iraq” that will take office by 30 June
and will “assume responsibility and authority for governing a sovereign Iraq,” the draft resolution on Iraq submitted to the Security Council by the US on 24 May proposes, inter alia, that the multinational force (for which read coalition) “shall have authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq.” Moreover by adding that “the mandate for the multinational force shall be reviewed 12 months from the date of this resolution,” the draft seeks to ensure that the occupation of Iraq remains open-ended, since the US can veto any resolution ending that mandate. So it was hardly surprising that the draft was given at best a tepid welcome by the Iraqis themselves, particularly since they do not appear to have been consulted. (One Kurdish member of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), Mahmud 'Uthman, said on 25 May that “the Security Council is discussing what concerns Iraq and it’s not fair. They should have invited Iraqis to be there at the discussions.” IGC president Ghazi al-Yawar said on 25 May that the draft “in many regards…fell short of our expectations,” but that “since it is only a draft, we hope that going forward it will take into account the ideas and proposals of the IGC to reflect the will of the people.” According to Mr Yawar the IGC’s main concerns are that the interim government will not have the right to ask foreign troops to leave the country and will not exercise full control over development and reconstruction funds. (The draft says that “funds in the Development Fund for Iraq shall be disbursed at the direction of the interim government,” but adds that “the International Advisory and Monitoring Board…shall continue its activities in monitoring the Development Fund for Iraq.”)
Nor were the Iraqis the only ones with doubts about the US draft, with the French once again taking the lead. French Foreign Minister Michel Barnier said on 25 May that “the government will not be credible unless it is given real powers and can thus convince the Iraqi people to take control of the transfer of sovereignty.” Accordingly the draft “must be discussed and improved on a certain number of points touching principally the sincerity, the reality and the credibility of the process of sovereignty transfer.” In France’s view the resolution must “affirm the return of sovereignty and responsibilities to the Iraqis; mark clearly the return of authority to the UN; and engage Iraq in a process of political and economic reconstruction that is credible enough to persuade the Iraqi population to adhere to it.” President Jacques Chirac summed up the French position on 27 May when he said that the draft was a “solid starting point” that “must be greatly improved on.” German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer made much the same point on 25 May, saying the resolution was “a good basis from which to start work to improve it.” On the same day, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi’s mission in Iraq was to “discover if there is agreement in Iraqi society, to what extent the government is seen as legitimate in Iraqi society and in the eyes of Iraq’s neighbors…Only after receiving this information will we be able to study the question of recognizing this government.” Similarly, Chinese UN Ambassador Wang Guangya said on 26 May that the council should not vote on the resolution before talking to the interim government. China also circulated a three page paper proposing changes to the resolution, including making the mandate of foreign forces in Iraq renewable rather than reviewable.
The US responded to criticism of the open-ended mandate for coalition forces in its draft by arguing disingenuously (not to say dishonestly) that it was not possible for security reasons to set a date for the end of the occupation. According to State Department spokesman Richard Boucher on 27 May, “one can’t set an arbitrary date for the end of the mandate for the multinational forces. There may be security situations that arise that need to be dealt with. It’s not a matter of forcing us to leave at some arbitrary date. It’s a matter of when we accomplish our task.” Since no-one was actually suggesting that the UN should set a date for the end of the occupation, Mr Boucher’s remarks seem unlikely to mend what could develop into damaging, if familiar, differences within the Security Council.
The Interim Government And Coalition Forces
The imminent transfer of sovereignty has also focused attention on the nature of the relationship between the interim government and the foreign forces in the country, creating an apparent rift between Britain and the US. Prime Minister Tony Blair opined on 25 May that “if there is a political decision as to whether you go into a place like Falluja in a particular way, that has to be done with the consent of the Iraqi government. And the final political control remains with the Iraqi government. That’s what the transfer of sovereignty means.” However, when Secretary of State Colin Powell was asked on the same day if the new Iraqi government would be able to veto US operations, he chose a rather roundabout way of saying no: “Obviously we would take into account whatever they might say at a political and military level. Ultimately, however, if it comes down to the US armed forces protecting themselves or in some way accomplishing their mission in a way that might not be in total consonance with what the Iraqi interim government might want to do at a particular moment in time, US forces remain under US command and will do what is necessary to protect themselves.” Mr Blair then attempted to correct himself – without making much headway – on 26 May by saying that “there is absolutely no doubt at all that the new Iraqi government has to have full sovereignty, that the multinational force remains by consent, that the ultimate strategic and political decision-making passes to the Iraqi government. After June 30, of course, once strategic decisions have been made, the running of any operation is under the multinational force and the commanders of that force. There is no question for the US and UK troops not being able to protect themselves, or their lives being put at risk, or being under anything else than US or UK command.” Perhaps the most straightforward assessment of the situation came from the American deputy director of operations in Iraq, Gen Mark Kimmitt, who said in effect that no-one knows. Asked on 26 May whether the interim government could veto coalition deployments, Gen Kimmitt said “these are the kind of discussions that they are going to be having in the next couple of weeks as they hammer out these points…It’s not been determined. We still have some time. There’s no doubt in our mind they will be resolved by 30 June.”
On the Iraqi side of the fence, Mr Yawar said that “we Iraqis see the necessity of the presence of forces. But in the period to come we want to have the right to ask these forces to leave if we deem that to be in the best interests of the country.” Another IGC member, Adnan Pachachi, told the Italia daily La Repubblica on 26 May that “it is written that the new government will be consulted” as far as foreign troops are concerned, but “we want the government’s opinion to be necessary and binding. In other words, the multinational force must come to Iraq with the permission of the Iraqi government and its movements in the country must be authorized by our executive.” But perhaps the most surprising assessment of the situation – and the one most welcome to the Bush administration – came from Iraqi Defense Minister 'Ali Allawi, who suggested on 25 May that the Iraqi army could be reconstituted from the Saddam-era army in time for the elections next January. Mr Allawi said that “in terms of the timeline for the presence of multinational forces to help us establish security and stability, I think it will be a question of months rather than years. Hopefully before the end of the year but certainly before the elections that will lead to a new constitutional assembly…we should have Iraqi security forces by and large in a position to assume greater responsibility inside their own country,” adding that “we are not starting from scratch. We are starting with a large number of soldiers and officers available from the previous army.”
Compromise In Najaf
The 27 May deal ending the confrontation between coalition forces and Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi militia in Najaf involved a compromise of sorts for the radical Shi'a cleric, since in exchange for the return of US forces to their barracks, he pledged to withdraw his Mahdi Army militia from the city. But it also involved what looked like a much larger compromise by the Americans, whose initial declared objectives were to kill or capture Mr Sadr and disband his militia and who apparently did neither. (Mr Sadr’s future is reportedly negotiable. Very little has been said about the future of the Mahdi Army.) Having set out at the beginning of April to bring Falluja under control and sideline Mr Sadr, the Americans have thus failed in both endeavors, a point which presumably will not be lost on other Iraqis.
Charles Snow