VOL. XLVII
No 19
The Political Scene (10 May 2004)
UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi’s scenario for choosing an interim Iraqi government is facing significant opposition within the American-appointed Iraqi Governing Council. As the scandal of the abuse of Iraqi prisoners further tarnishes the US’s standing in the Arab and Muslim world (and elsewhere, for that matter), the Americans have succeeded in calming the situation in Falluja, but at a cost. The security situation in Iraq means that the coalition is going to need more troops and money than originally planned. In Israel, voters of the right-wing Likud party have rejected Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s plan to withdraw unilaterally from Gaza.
Brahimi Faces IGC Opposition
It is no small irony that the Americans are now pinning their hopes of achieving a credible transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqis by 30 June on the formerly despised and “irrelevant” UN, and specifically on UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi, whose job is to arrive at a consensus on an interim government to hold the fort in Baghdad until elections in January 2005. However, these hopes were dealt a blow on 30 April when a respected Shi'a member of the US-appointed Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), Muhammad Bahr al-΄Ulum, indicated that Mr Brahimi’s mission is facing strong opposition within the IGC. Mr Bahr al-'Ulum said that “we reject special envoy Brahimi as the planner for the political process. We went to Bremer yesterday and told him this and that the plan for the future situation was entrusted to us, not to the UN.” Warning that “Iraqis will take to the streets if Brahimi insists on his view,” he added that “we are not under age in need of a guardian, Iraqis are not a herd of 27mn people to be directed by Brahimi and the coalition. Under the interim constitution we choose the next government in consultation with the coalition and the UN.” No doubt the Americans would like to dismiss these remarks as the opinion of an individual, but that does not appear to be the case. Press reports in Baghdad indicate that Mr Bahr al-΄Ulum’s position is shared by other IGC parties and members such as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), Patriotic Union of Kurdistan leader Jalal Talabani, Ahmad Chalabi of the Iraqi National Congress (formerly the Pentagon’s protégé, but now presumably out of favor) and the Iraqi communist party. And the fact that Mr Brahimi is now facing substantial opposition in the IGC was confirmed after he returned to Baghdad on 6 May when this month’s IGC president, ΄Abd al-Zahra ΄Uthman Muhammad, issued a statement after meeting with the UN envoy saying that Mr Muhammad had informed him that the IGC “does not favor a technocratic government and prefers widening the Governing Council to other Iraqi political forces that would supervise the cabinet.” So it looks as if Mr Brahimi may have to drop the idea of a purely technocratic interim government and include a seasoning of politicians – and that, of course, could create problems that jeopardize the 30 June deadline.
US Backs Off In Falluja
Two weeks ago, Egyptian President Husni Mubarak warned that “today there is hatred of the Americans like never before in the region,” and there can be little doubt that the publication of photographs of Iraqi prisoners being abused and humiliated by Americans in Baghdad’s Abu Ghraib prison and reports of the systematic abuse of detainees by an occupation force claiming moral superiority have shredded what little credibility and popularity the Americans retained in the Arab and Muslim worlds. By the same token, the occupation of Iraq is probably turning into a bonanza for al-Qa΄ida in Iraq and elsewhere in the region. Indeed, the Bush administration’s invasion of Iraq and its identification with the most recalcitrant policies of Israel’s right wing not only threaten to produce regional chaos but have also stoked an unprecedented level of helpless anger and resentment amongst the Arabs which must be driving recruits into the arms of any organization that promises to challenge American hegemony.
At least the Americans decided at this juncture that it might not be such a good idea to destroy Falluja in order to save it. Instead, after almost a month of intermittent fighting, they put together an Iraqi unit, the Falluja Brigade, to replace US forces in the city. And as has been the case numerous times before, they got it wrong the first time around by appointing Gen Jasim Muhammad Salah, a native of Falluja and a Republican Guard commander under Saddam Husain, to head the brigade. However, it then turned out that Gen Salah, who was given a hero’s welcome when he entered Falluja on 30 April, had not been adequately vetted, prompting three Shi΄a members of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) to issue a statement on 1 May saying that “we maintain that the return to service of Saddam’s Republican Guard in Falluja to the military and political arena is a military initiative of the American Marines and has nothing to do with the new Iraqi army… we stand strongly against this move because it seriously threatens the security and future of Iraq. The command of the brigade and many of its members repressed the people in the uprising of March 1991.” The statement also quoted Defense Minister ΄Ali Allawi as saying that “the Falluja brigade is not part of the new Iraqi army. There is no place in the new Iraqi army for senior officers of Saddam’s Republican Guards or those who have committed crimes against the Iraqi people.” Faced with rejection by their own appointees, the Americans hastily backtracked, with the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen Richard Myers, claiming on 2 May that Gen Salah had not been “vetted” and was not in command. By 4 May Gen Salah had been replaced by Gen Muhammad Latif, who declared that “I am the Falluja commander. Gen Salah is on my staff.”
American military officials were at pains to explain how these developments did not represent a setback for their attempt to pacify Falluja and arrest the killers of four American contractors. The marines issued a statement on 30 April saying that “coalition forces will maintain the right of freedom of movement in all areas” and that their objectives remain unchanged, “to eliminate armed groups, to collect and …control all heavy weapons and turn over foreign fighters and disarm anti-Iraqi insurgents,” as well as to identify “the murderers and mutilators of the four American contractors on 31 March.” Gen Mark Kimmit declared in Baghdad on 30 April that “we are certainly not withdrawing from Falluja. Nothing could be further from the truth.” However, while it was true that towards MEES press time on 7 May the Americans remained around, but not in, Falluja, there were no reports that armed groups had been eliminated or heavy weapons controlled by the Falluja Brigade, or that the murderers of the contractors had been identified. As for the foreign fighters, Gen Latif brushed the whole issue aside on 4 May when he said “there are no foreign fighters in Falluja. Maybe there were some a month ago. Now there are none.” If the Americans are to be believed, therefore, the American disengagement is merely another means to the same end. But one Iraqi who quite clearly does not see it that way is Hamid al-Bayati of SCIRI, who said on 2 May that “the Americans seem to think they are in a kitchen, constantly cooking a meal in which ingredients are thrown in until something works. They failed to defeat the Ba΄thists so they hire Saddam’s generals. They arm and prop up a police force, which they later discover is full of insurgents.”
In an otherwise dismal week for the Americans militarily and politically, the one bright spot was that Muqtada al-Sadr’s attempt to outflank the moderate Shi΄a establishment by defying the coalition from his sanctuary in Najaf appeared to be losing momentum after Shi΄a political leaders called on him to disarm his militia in Najaf and Karbala. One of the most respected Shi΄a clerics in the country, IGC member Muhammad Bahr al-΄Ulum, told a meeting of Shi΄a parties on 4 May that “we are taking a clear stand: Najaf and Karbala must be disarmed. These are holy cities that must have a Vatican-like status,” adding that “it is a shame to ask the occupation forces to solve this problem.”
Troops And Money
Meanwhile in Washington, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld announced on 4 May that instead of reducing US forces in Iraq to 105,000-115,000 troops as planned, the Pentagon would now maintain the current level of 138,000 through 2005. (Gen Norton Schwartz, the Joint Staff’s operations director, explained helpfully that “we had planned for a lesser number of brigade equivalents,” but that the security situation in Iraq had changed, “so we’re looking at a higher level of force structure.”) And the next day Mr Bush reneged on a pledge not to seek more money for Iraq before the November presidential elections by submitting a request to Congress for an additional $25bn to pay for military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq as of 1 October. To those who remember the sixties, these developments have a very familiar ring. All that would be needed for the analogy to Vietnam to be complete is for US officials to start perceiving “light at the end of the tunnel.”
Likud Rejects Sharon Plan
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s plan to separate Israel unilaterally from the Palestinians by withdrawing from Gaza suffered a major setback on 2 May when the territorial fundamentalists of his own Likud Party rejected the plan by 59.5% to 39.7% – on a turnout 51.6% of Likud’s 193,000 members – in a party referendum. Mr Sharon immediately indicated that the negative vote did not mean he was abandoning his proposal, saying on 3 May that “all those who think that the Likud leadership will stop its efforts to settle the conflict are wrong. I intend to present a plan including some amendments.” Mr Sharon did not indicate what those amendments might be, but whatever they are, they will have the support of the Americans. In Washington on the same day, White House spokesman Scott McClellan praised the plan as “a courageous and important step towards peace” and said the US still supported it, adding that “we will be in consultation with the prime minister… about how to move forward” when Mr Sharon visits the US next week.
Charles Snow