VOL. XLVII

No 18

03-May-2004

The Political Scene (3 May 2004)

UN envoy Lakdhar Brahimi has outlined to the Security Council his ideas for Iraq’s immediate political future. These accommodate the 30 June deadline set by the Americans for handing sovereignty to the Iraqis, but as the deadline approaches the kind of sovereignty involved is coming under growing scrutiny. The stand-off between coalition forces and Sunnis in Falluja and Shi'as in Najaf remains unresolved. In yet another reversal of an ill thought out policy, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) is rehiring cashiered army personnel and Ba'th party members. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has released himself from a commitment not to harm Yasir 'Arafat.  And nobody seems to know who was responsible for an explosion and gun battle in Damascus.

Brahimi Briefs Security Council

In a 27 April statement, UN envoy Lakdhar Brahimi has now reported back to the Security Council on the results of his visit to Iraq in the first half of April to look into the options for what he describes as “the formation of an administration to assume responsibility as of 30 June” until elections are held in January 2005. With the caveat that “our plans for the way forward remain very much a work in process,” Mr Brahimi  notes that “virtually every Iraqi with whom we met urged that there be no delay in bringing an end to the occupation by 30 June at the latest.” Since both the 15 November 2003 Political Agreement and the Transitional Administrative Law call for the dissolution of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) by 30 June, to continue with the IGC after that date is therefore “not an option.” Instead, Mr Brahimi says, “the majority of Iraqis with whom we spoke told us that, under the circumstances, they favored the establishment of a new Caretaker Government comprised of honest and technically qualified persons. There is near unanimity that the government should be led by a very qualified prime minister. We would suggest that a president should serve as head of state, with two vice presidents.” As to how the caretaker government is to be selected, Mr Brahimi says that “though it will certainly not be easy, we do believe that it shall be possible to identify by the end of May a group of people respected and acceptable to Iraqis across the country to form the caretaker government.” These individuals would then have one month to prepare to govern the country, and “these preparations should include reaching crystal clear understandings   on what the nature of the relationship will be between the sovereign caretaker government, the former occupying powers and any foreign forces remaining in the country after 30 June.” Once in office, the “sole purpose” of the caretaker government “will be to tend to the day-to-day administration of the country…until such time as a democratically elected government can be put in place…It should therefore refrain, to the maximum extent possible, from entering into long-term commitments that should await decision by an elected government.” It should also seek the advice of representatives of all parts of Iraqi society, and “to this end, we suggest the establishment of a Consultative Assembly or Council.”

Mr Brahimi also believes that “there is no greater priority than forging genuine national consensus, and to that end it would be extremely worthwhile to convene a National Conference” of at least 1,000 people to engage in a genuine dialogue. However, this conference – which inter alia will appoint the consultative council to advise the caretaker government – should be convened “not by the UN or any other external body, but by an Iraqi preparatory committee which should be established as soon as possible.” This committee should comprise “a small number of reputable and distinguished Iraqis …who are not seeking political office.” Since it will need at least 1-2 months to carry out consultations around the country, “it would seem that July would be the earliest time to convene the national conference.” In the meantime, “our intention is to resume our consultations in Iraq as soon as possible” in order to “help consolidate consensus around the ideas I have just outlined…once broad support for the framework is evident, we will then proceed to helping facilitate an Iraqi consensus on the actual composition of the caretaker government, as well as of the preparatory committee for the national conference. As I have indicated, I hope all of this can be completed before the end of May 2004.”

What Kind Of Sovereignty?

For domestic political reasons the US administration has thus far insisted that the CPA will be handing over sovereignty to the Iraqis on 30 June, but unless the Americans intend to put coalition forces under the command of the Iraqi government, which they have already made clear they do not, it could (and will be) argued that a government which does not control the forces ensuring the country’s internal security and external defense can scarcely be described as sovereign in the conventional sense of the word. The nearer the 30 June deadline comes, the more attention is being focused on the issue of what Mr Brahimi refers to delicately as “the relationship…between the sovereign caretaker government, the former occupying powers and any foreign forces remaining in the country” –  and the more US officials are being forced to concede that, as far as sovereignty is concerned, the emperor is at least half naked. US Secretary of State Colin Powell made a rather unsuccessful attempt to explain matters when he said on 26 April that “I think we can make the case to the Iraqi people that they are getting full sovereignty…and I hope they will understand that in order for this government to get up and running and to be effective, some of its sovereignty will have to be given back, if I can put it that way, or limited by them, an understanding by them that it’s important to let the multinational force be able to operate under its own command, US command, with the coalition forces under US direction.” US Iraqi ambassador designate John Negroponte – who will head a mission some 2,000 strong in Baghdad – was more forthright during his confirmation hearing before the Senate on 27 April. Asked if “the sovereign Iraqi government of 1 July would not have veto authority over military involvement in [for instance] Falluja?...If they have sovereignty, what does that mean?,” Mr Negroponte said: “That is why I use the term ‘exercise of sovereignty.’ I think in the case of military activity, their forces will come under the unified command of the multinational forces. That is the plan.” Mr Negroponte stressed that US forces “are going to be free to operate in Iraq as best they see fit,” adding that situations like Falluja would have to be “subject of real dialogue between our military commanders, the new Iraqi government and the US mission as well.”

A Deal In Falluja?

Falluja is much on the Americans’ mind for good reason, since after three weeks of intermittent fighting they have still not been able either to arrest the men responsible for the massacre of four Americans early in April or to pacify the hotbed of Sunni resistance by force. The American tactics (including repeated air strikes on 28 April after a truce plan involving joint American-Iraqi patrols broke down) came under fire from UN Secretary General Kofi Annan on 28 April when he observed that “violent military action by an occupying power against the inhabitants of an occupied country will only make matters worse,” since “the more the occupation is seen as taking steps that harm the civilians and the population, the greater the ranks of the resistance grow.” At MEES press time on 30 April the situation in Falluja was unclear. American military officials on the ground told reporters that at least some elements of the US forces were about to withdraw from the town and hand over to an Iraqi force headed by a General from Falluja, a veteran of the Saddam-era military, which sounds as if some kind of agreement had been reached. In Washington, however, a “senior defense official” was quoted as denying that there was a deal, saying on 29 April that “I’m told, having talked to the right people, there is no peace agreement, there is no pact.”  But he also admitted that “they are looking for ways to involve more Iraqi security forces into the situation,” adding that “what has been seen as some movement has been described to me as some repositioning.”

Things have been going equally badly for the Americans in their attempt to arrest the militant Shi'a cleric    Muqtada al-Sadr, who continues to defy the coalition and all its works from his sanctuary in the holy cities of Kufa and Najaf. The problem – which could easily have been foreseen before the Americans decided to arrest Mr Sadr at the end of March – is that an armed assault on Najaf is not an option, since it would terminally alienate Iraq’s Shi'a majority and very likely force Ayatollah Sistani to openly oppose the occupation. As Mr Annan put it on 28 April, “our concern is that any assault on Najaf will have really unimaginable consequences and could complicate very much the effort that we are trying to make in facilitating and working with the Iraqis to establish an interim government.” So it looks as if a negotiated settlement is the only way out of the current impasse on both the Sunni and Shi'a fronts. If so, the Americans’ attempt to flex their military muscle will have succeeded only in demonstrating the limitations imposed on that power in an Iraqi context.

Second Thoughts On Deba'thification

One of the first things the Americans did – just over a year ago –  after taking over Iraq was to dissolve the Iraqi army and republican guard. And they followed up this year by dismissing everyone who had been a member of the Ba'th party (including some 30,000 secondary school and college teachers) from their posts. The first decision

deprived a huge number of men with firearms and the training to use them of their living. The second brought the Iraqi educational system to a standstill. Now, in yet another U-turn by the CPA, US administrator Paul Bremer has implicitly acknowledged that these policies were mistaken in a TV address on 23 April. As far as concerns the military, Mr Bremer claimed that “our training of an Iraqi army and an Iraq police service continues at an extraordinary pace” and said that “Iraqi officers, drawn almost entirely from the many honorable men of the former Iraqi army, already command these forces. Over 70% of all the men in the Iraqi army and Iraq Civil Defense Corps served honorably in the former army…more of these officers with honorable records – from the former army and elsewhere – will serve in the months ahead as your army grows.” As for the wholesale deba'thification, Mr Bremer insisted that “the Ba'th party poisoned Iraqi political life…banning the party and removing from public life those who used it to commit crimes was necessary and remains necessary if we are to achieve your vision of a democratic Iraq.” But he went on to say that while deba'thification is the right policy for Iraq, “it has been poorly implemented. The requirement to join the party was strongly enforced among teachers and university professors. A group of teachers told me yesterday that poor execution of the deba'thification process has had a severe impact on teachers and university professors.” Accordingly, it has been agreed that “decisions made by local appeals committees of the Ministry of Education will be effective immediately. This will allow thousands of teachers to return to work. Thousands more will begin receiving pensions this week.”

Sharon Shrugs Off A Commitment

It now transpires that one of the topics discussed at the 14 April meeting between Mr Bush and Mr Sharon was the latter’s intention to assassinate Palestinian Authority President Yasir 'Arafat, although “discussed” is probably not the right verb. Mr Sharon revealed in an interview on 23 April that he had told Mr Bush he had released himself from an earlier commitment not to harm the Palestinian leader. “I said in our first meeting about three years ago that I accepted his request not to harm 'Arafat physically,” Mr Sharon said. “But I am released from this commitment. I release myself from this commitment regarding 'Arafat.” With Iraq in flames and the entire region up in arms about Mr Bush’s concessions to Mr Sharon on settlements and refugees, probably the last thing the Americans need is for Israel to assassinate Mr 'Arafat, which may explain why the administration’s reaction was uncharacteristically forceful. An unnamed senior administration official said on the same day that “we have made it entirely clear to the Israeli government that we would oppose any such action and have done so again in the wake of these remarks,” and that this message had been passed to the Israelis by national security adviser Condoleezza Rice in a phone call to Mr Sharon’s chief of staff. That was evidently enough to make the Israelis reconsider the timing – if not the principle –  of any action against Mr 'Arafat, since deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert told Army Radio on 25 April that Mr Sharon “does not intend to put something into  action this very week, or today or tomorrow. He set out a position in principle regarding 'Arafat and the immunity he thought he enjoyed.”    

Explosion In Damascus

Nobody seemed to have any clear ideas as to who was responsible for the explosion outside an empty UN building in Damascus on 27 April. According to an Interior Ministry statement the next day, “a group of four persons placed a device under a parked car early on Tuesday evening. The device exploded, causing damage to an uninhabited building in Mazzih. A clash ensued between the security forces and the terrorist group, which fled aboard a second car throwing grenades at the security forces.”  Suspicion immediately fell on Islamic groups, although it was not clear why they would want to bomb an empty building rather than the nearby Canadian embassy and British ambassador’s residence. In Washington State Department spokesman Adam Ereli was strictly non-committal, saying only that “what we know is that there was a firefight between Syrian police and unidentified gunmen in a residential neighborhood of Damascus yesterday evening.” Indeed, the only people who seemed certain about the incident were US politicians eager to impose the sanctions in the Syria Accountability Act, one of whom, Rep Eliot Engel of New York, declared that “this was staged…we have been more than patient.  I demand that the law be implemented now.”

Charles Snow