VOL. XLVII
No 16
19
The Political Scene (19 April 2004)
President George Bush has endorsed Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s plan for a unilateral “separation” from the Palestinians, and in doing so has reversed US policy on settlements and refugees and in all likelihood delivered the coup de grace to the faltering international “road map” to peace. The Arab reaction has so far been curiously muted, while the Europeans are hoping against hope that Mr Sharon’s proposed withdrawal from Gaza will be only a first step. The decision is likely to complicate matters for the Americans in Iraq, where coalition forces continue to face attacks from Sunni and Shi'a militants and where – bizarrely – an Iranian delegation appears to trying to mediate between the coalition and its Shi'a opponents. The upsurge in fighting has also disrupted the reconstitution of the Iraqi armed forces and economic reconstruction. In Algeria, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika has won a landslide victory in elections described by the Americans as “genuinely contested.”
Bush Caves In To Sharon
It has been clear all along that the international “road map” to regional peace proposed by the UN, US, EU and Russia in September 2002 – which envisages the creation of a viable Palestinian state by 2005 – was not to the liking of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. And it has been equally obvious for some time that Mr Sharon’s plan for a unilateral “separation” from the Palestinians is intended to replace the road map rather than complement it. Given electoral realities in the US and President George Bush’s proven reluctance to stand up to the Israelis, it was therefore to be expected that the Americans would sit still for this none-too-subtle sleight of hand when Mr Sharon met with Mr Bush in Washington on 14 April. What was not to be expected was that Mr Bush used the occasion to go out of his way to concede something that is not his to surrender (and is enshrined in Security Council resolutions as well), the Palestinian refugees’ right of return, and to reverse what has been a cardinal point of US policy since 1967, the position that Israeli settlements in the occupied territories are illegal and an obstacle to peace. In a statement after the meeting, Mr Bush described Israel’s plans “to remove certain military installations and all settlements from Gaza” – the Israelis are apparently planning to retain a military presence in Gaza – “and certain military installations and settlements from the West Bank” as “historic and courageous actions.” He went on to say that while “the US will not prejudice the outcome” of final status negotiations, “the realities on the ground and in the region have changed greatly over the last several decades, and any final settlement must take into account those realities and be agreeable to the parties.” The goal of two independent states remains the key to resolving the conflict, according to Mr Bush, and “the US is strongly committed to Israel’s security and well being as a Jewish state.” Accordingly “it seems clear that an agreed, just, fair and realistic framework for a solution to the Palestinian refugee issue, as part of any final status agreement, will need to be found through the establishment of a Palestinian state and the settling of Palestinian refugees there, rather than in Israel.” As for the West Bank, “Israel must have secure and recognized borders which should emerge from negotiations between the parties,” but “in light of new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli population centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949... It is realistic to expect that any final status agreement will only be achieved on the basis of mutually agreed changes that reflect these realities.”
Mr Bush did refer twice to the road map: once to say that “we drafted the road map” in order to realize his “vision” of a peaceful Middle East; and once to urge the Palestinians to “meet their obligations under the road map.” Nonetheless, his remarks look very much like the coup de grace for a process that has struggled from the beginning. Mr Sharon did little to dispel that impression when he omitted even the most perfunctory reference to Palestinian statehood (or, for that matter to the road map) from his statement after the White House meeting, saying only that “my plan will create a new and better reality for the state of Israel. And it also has the potential to create the right conditions to resume negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.” Little wonder that a “senior Israeli official” told AFP in Washington 14 April “the US made unequivocal statements not heard in 56 years,” (ie since Israel was established in 1948). “Such statements have never been made by the US, not by any government nor by any president.” And if there are any doubts that Mr Bush has caved in to the Israelis, here is what he had to say less than a year ago on 29 May 2003: “I am absolutely determined to carry on to the bitter end because US foreign policy is not limited to defending its own interests. We want peace. This region will only have peace if it has freedom. For the Palestinians this means the creation of a state. A Palestinian state must be viable. The expansion of settlements is a contradiction to our efforts to create a Palestinian state.” Mr Bush followed that up at the Sharm al-Shaikh summit on 3 June by saying “Israel has got responsibilities. Israel must deal with the settlements. Israel must make sure there is a continuous territory that the Palestinians can call home…I’m the kind of person who, when I say something, I mean it. I mean that the world needs to have a Palestinian state that is free and at peace.” Now, it would seem, the solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict is to be sought not through a negotiated (and thus viable) settlement, but in an Israeli fait accompli endorsed by a passive American administration. It need hardly be pointed out that, in anything more than the very shortest of terms, this is a recipe for regional disaster
Arab Reaction Muted, Europeans Cautious
It is a safe bet that Mr Bush’s announcement will do nothing to improve the Americans’ already battered popularity throughout the Arab world, but official reactions were strangely muted. The Palestinians were predictably dismayed that the Americans had so cavalierly given away one of their strongest negotiating cards. (Apropos of the right of return, it should perhaps be noted that no-one on either side ever realistically expected it to be exercised. The question was what the Palestinians would get for giving it up.) In Jordan, Foreign Minister Marwan al-Mu΄ashir said on 15 April that “the American administration should not give any concessions that relate to final status issues, especially those that relate to borders, refugees and settlements.” The Saudis said the next day that “Saudi Arabia was surprised by these views… because, if cemented, they will complicate peace opportunities and cripple the peace process on which the hopes and expectations of the international community are staked.” Egypt, presumably out of profound embarrassment, said nothing at all. The only Arab official whose reaction reflected the anger at the popular level was Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, who said that the shift in US policy was a “violent shock to anyone who believes in Middle East peace. This stance will have a dangerous fallout, notably the end of hopes for peace, an increase in anti-American sentiments and the recourse to force in order to secure rights.”
In the longer run, the American u-turn is also likely to be a source of friction with Europe, where Irish Foreign Minister Brian Cowen said on 15 April that “the EU will not recognize any change to the pre-1967 borders other than those arrived at by agreement between the parties,” adding that any settlement “must include an agreed, just, fair and realistic solution to the refugee issue.” A similar position was taken on 14 April by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who, according to a spokesman, believes that any peace agreement “should be determined in negotiations between the parties, based on relevant Security Council resolutions” and that “they should refrain from taking any steps that would preempt the outcome of such talks.” For the moment, though, most reactions have focused on the remote possibility that an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza will be the first step towards implementing the road map. British Prime Minister Tony Blair said on 14 April the international community should now “work together to seize this opportunity to inject new life into the peace process in accordance with the road map,” and the next day declared bravely that “I don’t see the road map as sidelined at all.” Even Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov took an optimistic view of Mr Sharon’s intentions, saying on 15 April that “this could be helpful – not as a single step but as the start.” It was left to French President Jacques Chirac to disagree when he said on 15 April that “for the borders, I consider that international law must be respected. I have reservations about any unilateral or bilateral undermining of international law… it is a troubling precedent. It’s dangerous.”
Truce In Falluja, Negotiations in Najaf
Mr Bush’s decision to bend US policy even further in Israel’s favor is not going to make life any easier for the Americans in Iraq, where coalition forces have reasserted a measure of authority, but where it still looked as if matters could spin out of control at any moment. Last week the Americans initiated a confrontation with two separate groups: with the Sunnis in Falluja, north of Baghdad; and with the followers of militant Shi΄a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr in the south of the country. In Falluja, where there were reports of heavy civilian casualties, a tenuous truce declared on 11 April was theoretically still in force at the end of the week while negotiations took place. (The American decision to negotiate with their Sunni opponents may have had something to do with the fact that the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) issued a statement on 10 April calling for “an immediate cease-fire and for resorting to political solutions for situations in some parts of the country, particularly in the city of Falluja.” One moderate IGC member, former foreign minister Adnan Pachachi, went so far as to denounce the US assault on Falluja and the use of mass punishment as “illegal and totally unacceptable.”) Elsewhere in the country, coalition forces retook the towns of Nasiriya and Kut from Mr Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia and were poised near the shrine city of Najaf, where Mr Sadr has taken shelter. The Americans initially took an uncompromising stance towards the Shi'a firebrand, with the commander of their ground forces in Iraq, Gen Ricardo Sanchez, declaring on 12 April that “the mission of US forces is to kill or capture Muqtada al-Sadr… we have maneuvered forces down into the vicinity of Najaf to ensure that we’re all prepared to conduct offensive operations to eliminate the final elements of Muqtada al-Sadr’s influence there.” However, with Iraqis of all stripes (including the Pentagon’s protégé on the IGC, Ahmad Chalabi) warning that a decision to send troops into Najaf – after Mecca the holiest city in the world for Shi΄as – would be catastrophic, the Americans evidently had second thoughts about the wisdom of an attack that could force the mainstream Shi΄a establishment (and Ayatollah ΄Ali al-Sistani) to side with Mr Sadr. Cooler heads were also in evidence on the other side of the fence, with a representative of Mr Sadr, ΄Abd al-Karim al-'Anzi, revealing on 14 April that “Sayyid Muqtada made positive proposals to end the crisis… He realizes that an armed confrontation is not in anybody’s interest.”
Iran Sends A Delegation
The Americans need all the help they can get in Iraq and in theory the Iranians, who are scarcely disinterested bystanders, have a number of reasons to give it to them. After all, the Americans have disposed of two of Tehran’s worst enemies, the Taliban and Saddam Husain, and are committed to a democratic process that will in all likelihood transfer power to Iraq’s Shi΄a majority. So it was perhaps not surprising when Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi revealed on 14 April that “previously we had dialogue,” although he added that “currently it has stopped because we felt we were going nowhere. The Americans give promises, but they don’t keep their promises. Currently they are taking a wrong path.” Separately on the same day Mr Kharrazi said that “there has been a lot of correspondence with the US” – via the Swiss embassy in Tehran – “about Iraq. Naturally there are such requests from the US that we help improve the situation in Iraq, and we are making efforts in this regard.” The idea that the US had asked Iran for help turned out to be too much for State Department spokesman Richard Boucher, who denied that the US had made any such request, but acknowledged that the US had “recently” sent messages to Tehran. “We have done that all along and recently as well,” he said. “We have made clear to Iran, as we have made clear to others of Iraq’s neighbors, that they need to play a helpful role.” Despite Mr Boucher’s strictures, however, the Americans clearly did not demur when the British (reportedly) arranged for the Iranians to send a delegation headed by a top Foreign Ministry official, Hossein Sadeghi, to Baghdad on 14 April for talks with the IGC, clerics and coalition officials. Mr Sadeghi insisted (to AFP in Baghdad) that he was not in Iraq to mediate between the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and Mr Sadr, although his delegation might visit Najaf to meet Mr Sadr, saying that “there is no mediation. We are here to have a clear assessment of the situation to have a better understanding of what’s going on in Iraq.” But the fact that the Iranians sent a representative of the foreign ministry rather than, for example, an official from the Revolutionary Guards suggests that the Iranian are prepared to help the CPA out. And that is evidently what some of the coalition’s Iraqi opponents also believe, since on 15 April the first secretary of the Iranian embassy in Baghdad was assassinated in a move that Mr Sadeghi said was “most certainly” linked to his mission.
Setbacks For The CPA
The fighting in Iraq could be seen as demonstrating the limitations of US military power when it comes to solving problems that are essentially political. It was also a setback for the coalition’s attempts to reconstitute the Iraqi army and security forces, restart the economy and somehow persuade the UN to play a greater role in the country. The coalition’s problems with Iraq’s nascent armed forces were highlighted when it was revealed on 11 April that an army battalion had refused orders to move to Falluja on 5 April on the grounds that its members “did not sign up to fight Iraqis.” Elsewhere in the country, according to the head of US Central Command, Gen John Abizaid, on 12 April, the response of the Iraqi armed forces had in some instances been “a great disappointment.” The next day the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen Richard Myers, confirmed that “their performance has been uneven. But there are instances where they performed very well, and other instances where they’ve been less than perfect.” As far as the economy is concerned, the kidnapping of foreign hostages by various groups (and the murder of an Italian hostage on 15 April) is threatening to derail reconstruction (see lead story). And Mr Annan made clear on 13 April that there was little hope that the UN would return to Iraq in any strength until the security situation improves. “For the foreseeable future, insecurity is going to be a major constraint for us,” he said. “So I cannot say right now that I’m going to be sending a large UN team. Everybody knows protection is absolutely crucial for the return of our staff and for their effectiveness.”
Bouteflika Wins A Landslide
At first sight, the results of Algeria’s 8 April presidential elections were all too familiar: incumbent President Abdelaziz Bouteflika received 83.5% of the vote, with his nearest challenger, former prime minister Ali Benflis, receiving a mere 7.93% (and four other candidates obtaining even less than that). This lopsided victory initially lent credence to Mr Benflis’s charge that Mr Bouteflika had engaged in “rampant fraud.” But then something curious happened. In Washington State Department spokesman Adam Ereli said on 9 April that the polls had been a “genuinely contested multi-party presidential election,” adding: “Preliminary statements by observers indicate that election-day processes were generally transparent and free from fraud. We have no reason to question or to doubt these assessments. We did not see the kind of irregularities or actions that call into question the credibility of the results.” Moreover on the same day, Mr Bush formally congratulated Mr Bouteflika on his reelection, saying “these elections represent another step on the road toward democracy in Algeria.” And Mr Chirac added France’s seal of approval when he made a one-day visit to Algiers on 15 April. So contrary to appearances, it would seem that the Algerians, after more than a decade of civil strife, have pulled off that rarest of regional events, a genuinely democratic presidential election.
Charles Snow