VOL. XLVII
No 14
The Political Scene (12 April 2004)
The Americans have initiated a confrontation with Shi'a and Sunni militants in Iraq that threatens to become a general insurrection with unforeseeable consequences.
Confrontation In Iraq
After the British occupied Iraq in March 1917, it took them a full three years to alienate enough Iraqis to spark a full-scale revolt against their rule. But it now looks as if the Americans may better this record by a considerable margin, since barely a year after invading Iraq, a ham-fisted attempt to suppress a dissident Shi'a cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr, has developed into a confrontation that threatens to unite militant Sunnis and Shi'as, as well as Ba'thists, against the Americans. The sequence of events that could change the whole nature of the US involvement in Iraq began when the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) closed Mr Sadr’s weekly publication al-Hawza on 28 March and followed this up by arresting Mr Sadr’s deputy, Mustafa al-Yaqubi, on 3 April in connection with the murder of a respected moderate Shi'a cleric, 'Abd al-Majid Khoei, in Najaf in April 2003. The next day, Mr Sadr issued a statement saying that “there is no use for demonstrations, as your enemy loves to terrify and suppress opinions, and despises people. I ask you not to resort to demonstrations because they have become a losing card and we should seek other ways. Terrorize your enemy, as we cannot remain silent over its violations.” This resulted in clashes on the same day between US forces and Mr Sadr’s militia, the Mahdi Army, in Baghdad and Kufa (near Najaf) in which seven US soldiers died. The next day, as fighting continued in Baghdad and the Mahdi Army briefly took over the governor’s office in Basra, the Americans chose to open an offensive against Falluja in the “Sunni triangle” north of Baghdad, where four US civilians were killed last week. In a move which they must already be regretting, they also chose this moment to compound their difficulties by announcing that they intended to execute the warrant for Mr Sadr’s arrest in connection with the Khoei case which, according to a CPA spokesman, “was issued in the last several months” – thus ensuring that they must either seize Mr Sadr in whichever mosque in Najf in which he has taken refuge or lose all credibility. US administrator Paul Bremer sought to justify this incomprehensible decision by saying that “we have a group under Muqtada al-Sadr that has basically placed itself outside the legal authorities, the coalition and Iraqi officials. He is attempting to establish his authority in the place of the legitimate authority. We will not tolerate this,” to which Mr Sadr replied that “if Bremer means that Sayid Muqtada is an outlaw according to the US laws, then I’m proud of it.” On 6 April Shi'a militiamen attacked Italian forces in the southern town of Nasiriya, while 12 US marines were killed in the Sunni town of Ramadi 70 miles west of Baghdad. The next day fighting spread to Kut, south of Baghdad, where Ukrainian troops were forced to withdraw, and the Shi'a holy city of Karbala, where Polish forces killed the head of Mr Sadr’s office. At MEES press time on 8 April, it appeared that fighting was continuing in all these locations.
Sistani Neutral
The one bright spot in a rapidly deteriorating situation for the Americans was that the man regarded by the majority of Iraq’s Shi'as as their spiritual mentor, Ayatollah 'Ali al-Sistani, has not so far come out in support of the insurgents – and the ayatollah in effect withdrew to a neutral corner on 7 April when he issued a statement saying that “we condemn the way the occupying forces are dealing with current events, just as we condemn aggression against public and private property which leads to unrest and stops Iraqi officials from carrying out their duties in the service of the people. We call for the matter to be dealt with wisdom and patience and in peaceful ways, abstaining from any provocative steps which will lead to more chaos and bloodshed.” In Washington, however, the rhetoric was considerably less temperate. President George Bush declared on 5 April that “we will not be shaken by the thugs and terrorists” and that “these killers don’t have values.” On the same day White House spokesman Scott McClellan said that “what you’re talking about is one individual who is seeking to derail democracy and freedom for the Iraqi people. This is one individual who is seeking to undermine the transition process to sovereignty.” The next day State Department spokesman Adam Ereli sounded a lot shriller when he said “Sadr and his small number of followers, we don’t see them as representative of a religious cause but rather as representative of political gangsterism…This is not a question of Islamic extremism versus secularism, this is a question of civic-mindedness versus thuggery.” Also on 6 April, Mr Bush emphasized – perhaps unwisely – that Mr Sadr’s insurrection would not delay the transfer of sovereignty scheduled for 30 June, saying “we will pass sovereignty on June 30…we’re not going to be intimidated by thugs and assassins.” And in Iraq, Brig General Mark Kimmitt asserted on 7 April that “we will attack and destroy the Mahdi army. Our offensive operations will be deliberate, they will be precise, and they will be powerful and they will succeed.” But even if the general’s confidence turns out to be justified and the Americans manage to suppress the present insurrection, it seems very likely that they will have succeeded only in sowing the seeds of horrendous future problems.
Charles Snow