VOL. XLVII
No 10
08
The Political Scene (8 March 2004)
Iraq has an interim constitution which leaves a number of major issues unresolved. Attacks on Shi'a shrines in Baghdad and Karbala have caused heavy casualties.
Iraq’s Interim Constitution
US Secretary of State Colin Powell greeted the interim constitution agreed on by the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) on 1 March as “a major achievement… which I think is terrific,” and it is true that, in addition to incorporating a comprehensive bill of human rights, the document:
Sets a deadline of
the end of January 2005 for elections for a transitional assembly which will
draft a permanent constitution by 15 August 2005.
Sets a deadline of
15 December 2005 for full parliamentary elections.
Says that Islam
“is the official religion of the state and is to be considered a source of
legislation” (the same phrasing used in
Kuwait’s
1962 constitution).
Declares that Iraq
will be a federal state.
Sets a target of 25% for female participation in the new assembly.
However the agreement is notable as much for what it does not decide as for what it does: there is no indication
how the body to which the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) will hand sovereignty on 30 June will be chosen (according to an unnamed coalition official, this will be decided in the next couple of months, taking into account future recommendations by the UN); there is no attempt to define what federation actually means, which will be determined later (according to Iraqi National Congress spokesman Intifad Qanbar “Kurdistan will continue to be federal, the rest of Iraq will be given the right to prepare to form federal states. The elected government will decide on the status of federalism and deal with this strategic situation”); and it does not address the tricky question of what is to become of the various Kurdish and Shi'a militias. So pace Mr Powell, a fairer assessment of the interim constitution would be that while it appears to have arrived at an acceptable compromise on the role of Islam, which is indeed an achievement, in other respects it defers a decision on a number of major and potentially contentious issues.
Shi'a Shrines Attacked
The clear intention behind the 2 March attacks on Shi'a shrines in Karbala and Baghdad in which at least 171 people died was to foster sectarian violence in Iraq, and in the immediate aftermath both coalition officials and IGC members named Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian with links to al-Qa'ida, as a possible suspect. However a 2 March statement claiming to come from al-Qa'ida strongly denied responsibility, saying that “we have nothing to do with these acts. We strike the American crusaders and their allies. We strike the Iraqi police who work for America…We strike the infidel council, called the Governing Council, and all those who surround it, among them Sunnis and Shi'ites.” If this statement is authentic (and there is no way of knowing whether it is or not), it is perhaps a sign that al-Qa'ida realizes that such attacks, if carried out by foreigners, are liable to be counterproductive by creating a greater sense of solidarity among the Iraqis. Whatever the case, both the Iraqis and the CPA seemed convinced the attacks were the work of outsiders, and the Americans accordingly also came in for a fair amount of blame for failing to secure Iraq’s borders, with the Shi'a leader, Ayatollah 'Ali al-Sistani, declaring on 2 March that “we put responsibility on the occupation forces for the noticeable procrastination in controlling the borders of Iraq and preventing infiltrators and not strengthening Iraqi national forces and supplying them with the necessary equipment for their jobs.” And US governor Paul Bremer was sufficiently stung by this criticism to announce on 3 March that the US would spend an extra $60mn on border security, although given the length and porosity of Iraq’s borders it is doubtful whether that will be anything like enough.
Charles Snow