VOL. XLVI

No 43

27-October-2003
 

The Political Scene (27 October 2003)

 

The British, French and German foreign ministers have persuaded the Iranians to meet the IAEA’s demands for fuller disclosure of their nuclear program. Both the Turks and the Americans seem to be having second thoughts about the wisdom of deploying Turkish troops in Iraq. Last week’s incident in which an American helicopter was downed in Iraq near the Syrian frontier was not the work of infiltrators after all. The EU has been trying to work out a common position on Iraq. And US Secretary of State Colin Powell believes the Sudanese civil war may be over by the end of the year.

 

Iran Meets IAEA Deadline

Whatever their differences over Iraq, the French, German and British foreign ministers closed ranks when they arrived in Tehran on 21 October to try to persuade Iran to meet the 31 October deadline set by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the full disclosure of the details of its nuclear program. Dominique de Villepin declared that “we share the worries of the international community… we would like to have full transparency.” Jack Straw said that while all three countries “respect the right of any nation to have a civilian nuclear program,” they could not accept Iran being “involved in any kind of proliferation activities.” And Joschka Fischer warned that “if we can agree today it would be a step forward, if not we have a very serious problem.” As it turned out, the Iranians had apparently decided that acceding to the IAEA’s demands was preferable to risking the kind of international isolation which they experienced in the years immediately after the Islamic revolution, and at the end of the visit the two sides issued a declaration in which “the Iranian authorities reaffirmed that nuclear weapons have no place in Iran’s defense doctrine” and informed the visiting ministers that the Iranian government: “has decided to engage on full cooperation with the IAEA to address and resolve through full transparency all requirements and outstanding issues of the agency and clarify and correct any possible failures and deficiencies within the IAEA;” “has decided to sign the IAEA additional protocol and… will continue to cooperate with the agency in accordance with the protocol in advance of its ratification;” and “has decided voluntarily to suspend all uranium enrichment and processing activities as defined by the IAEA.” The Iranians followed up by handing in a report to the IAEA’s headquarters in Vienna which, according to their IAEA ambassador, “fully discloses all our past peaceful activities in the nuclear field” (and which was described by IAEA director Muhammad al-Baradi΄i as a “large set of documents”). Internationally, the Iranian move was given a wary welcome, with White House spokesman Scott McClellan saying that “if Iran does sign and implement the additional protocol, cooperate fully with the IAEA, and end its uranium enrichment reprocess activities, it would be a positive step in the right direction… the proof of the value of today’s agreement is not just on the words of the communiqué but above all on the implementation.” In Berlin the next day, a German foreign ministry spokesman took a similar wait-and-see attitude, saying “we are realists, we will be looking very carefully to see how it is implemented.” Curiously enough, the warmest welcome appeared to come from President George Bush, who said on 22 October that “it looks like they are accepting the demands of the free world and it’s up to them to prove they’ve accepted the demands. It’s a very positive development.” And predictably enough, the sourest reaction came from Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom, who said on 22 October that “we know they are trying to develop nuclear weapons, we know their real intentions.”

 

Turks On Hold

Faced with virtually unanimous opposition from Iraqis across the political spectrum to the idea of deploying Turkish troops in Iraq, the Turks, who hitherto have pretty much taken the position that the US is the only authority in Iraq and that the views of the Governing Council (GC) are irrelevant, have evidently decided that it might be a good idea to take Iraqi public opinion into account. According to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan on 18 October, “if we are wanted we will go, if we are not wanted we will not. We have not made a ‘must’ decision. Iraq is our neighbor and will continue to be so in the future. We will not undertake anything that may lead to problems. The demands of the Iraqi people are very important to us.” The Americans also seem to be having second thoughts about the wisdom of sending the Turks into Iraq, with Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage saying on 20 October that the decision to send in Turkish troops needed to be “worked out carefully” and that “it’s better to get it right than to get it in a hurry.” And he too indicated that the sensibilities of the GC might have to be taken into account when he said “this is not simply a matter for the Turks… there are some general questions that the GC of Iraq have about some of their neighbors participating in security activities inside Iraq.” So for the moment at least, it seems that a potentially disastrous decision to deploy the Turks has been put on hold, however much the Americans might like to see a Muslim country at their side in Iraq. And their hopes in this regard were further dashed when Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf indicated on 17 October that last week’s Security Council resolution on Iraq had done little to allay his misgivings about sending troops to Iraq, saying that Pakistan would only do so if the Iraqis wanted them and other Muslim countries did likewise, and that “merely the passage of the UN Security Council resolution has not brought about any change in this environment.”

 

What Infiltrators?

The claim by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) last week that infiltrators from Syria had been the cause of a 14 October firefight near the Iraqi-Syrian frontier in which a US helicopter was downed came at a convenient time for supporters of the anti-Syrian Syria Accountability Act, which was voted through by an overwhelming margin in the House of Representatives the next day. But if the alleged infiltration did influence the vote, it appears it was yet another example of action based on misleading intelligence (or perhaps even disinformation), since the commander of the US troops involved, Lt Col Greg Reilly of the 1st squadron of the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, told the International Herald Tribune on 21 October that there had been a firefight, but that it was the latest in a series of attacks on US forces by men from inside the town of Husaybah on the Iraqi side of the border and that infiltrators had not been involved, adding that “you got to be on the ground to get the truth.” (Col Reilly also said that the more experienced anti-American fighters in Husaybah were being sent there from other cities in Iraq.) As for more general allegations – usually by Israel’s neoconservative friends in the US – of Syria’s complicity in infiltrating fighters into Iraq, Col Reilly said that in three months his men, who patrol a 200km stretch of the border, had not intercepted a single foreign fighter trying to cross into Iraq, and that the only illegal immigrants had been nomadic Bedouin tending their sheep. Of course it is always possible that foreign fighters are infiltrating elsewhere along the border. But in the end it is probably irrelevant whether fighters are crossing into Iraq from Syria or not, since the neoconservatives, who seem set on provoking a confrontation with Syria come hell or high water, have never shown any great inclination to allow facts to interfere with their plans.

 

The EU And Iraq

At the EU summit in Brussels on 17 October, French President Jacques Chirac made it clear that France and other like-minded countries had only voted for the previous day’s Security Council resolution on Iraq reluctantly and faute de mieux. “Everyone is conscious of the fact that the situation is bad, that it is getting worse and that everything must be done to improve it,” he said. “To improve this situation, we must try first of all not to give the impression that the international community is divided, whatever the arguments on one side or the other. That is the reason why, even if no-one is completely satisfied, yesterday’s resolution in the Security Council was voted through unanimously.” Mr Chirac also pointed out that the “differences of opinion which existed” on Iraq “globally still exist in the EU,” but the statement issued at the end of the summit appeared to favor the demands of the anti-war group rather than those of the pro-Americans. This “confirms the EU determination and commitment to play a significant role in the political and economic reconstruction of Iraq, within the framework of the relevant resolutions,” and listed four “essential” conditions: an adequate security environment, a “strong and vital UN role,” a “realistic schedule for the handing over of political responsibility to the Iraqi people” and the creation of a multi-donor trust fund. Overall, the statement defined the EU’s goal as “a prosperous, stable and sovereign Iraq, whose territorial integrity is preserved.” Conspicuously absent from this description is the adjective ‘democratic.’

 

Powell Sees Light At The End Of The Sudanese Tunnel

US Secretary of State Colin Powell sounded optimistic on 22 October after visiting Naivasha in Kenya, where the Sudanese government and rebel groups are negotiating an end to the 20-year-old civil war in Sudan. ”I can see the end is in sight, based on what I have heard today I believe that a final agreement is within the grasp of the parties,” he said. “This is a moment of opportunity that must not be lost.” Mr Powell added that Sudanese Vice President ΄Ali ΄Uthman Taha and John Garang, the leader of the main rebel group, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), were making “excellent progress“ towards an agreement on sharing Sudan’s oil wealth  and that “both parties have agreed to remain in negotiations and conclude a comprehensive settlement no later than the end of December.” The parties to the negotiations themselves took a more cautious, but still optimistic, line. SPLA spokesman Samson Kwaje said the December date “may not be a hard and fast deadline but it is realistic. It is always good to set a target and whether we will achieve it or not will depend on circumstances.”  And according to Sudanese presidential peace adviser Ghazi Salah al-Din, the December date “is an expression of hope and commitment. It is not putting a fix on the end of negotiations.”

 

Charles Snow