VOL. XLVI
No 41
The Political Scene (13 October 2003)
With little sign of any progress towards a new Security Council resolution on Iraq, the Americans have welcomed (and the Iraqis have deplored) the Turkish parliament’s decision to authorize the deployment of Turkish forces in Iraq. In Washington an ”Iraq stabilization group” has been set up to coordinate the reconstruction campaign. US relations with Syria are reaching a new low.
Little Progress At UN: Turkey Authorizes Deployment In Iraq
Towards the end of the week, after Russia and France joined UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in criticizing the draft Security Council resolution on Iraq tabled by Washington on 1 October, it looked as if the Americans were about to abandon their attempt to devise a resolution that would somehow provide UN cover for international military and financial aid while allocating only a marginal role in Iraq to the UN itself. Russian President Vladimir Putin said on 3 October that “we are not satisfied with the draft by our American partners, though they are trying to find a compromise.” And the next day French President Jacques Chirac said that “for us there was some disappointment. We noted that, all told, it presents little progress compared to the previous draft.” After several days of what the French UN ambassador, Jean Marc de la Sabliere, described as “an interesting exchange of views,” the US ambassador, John Negroponte, indicated on 7 October that the Americans were not contemplating any major changes to the draft, saying “if in the coming days we put forward a resolution…with the idea of bringing it to an early vote, they shouldn’t expect any significant or radical departures. We think it’s a good resolution.” That appeared to put paid to the chances of achieving anything like the unanimity which could put some real force behind the resolution.
In an otherwise hostile international environment, the one piece of good news for the Americans was the 7 October decision by the Turkish parliament to authorize the deployment of Turkish troops in Iraq for one year (leaving the size, timing and location of the deployment to be decided by the government). The Americans were delighted, with White House spokesman Scott McClellan saying on 7 October that “we welcome that decision and we will be working with Turkish officials on the details of their decision,” while at the State Department spokesman Richard Boucher declared that “the US believes that Turkish troops would contribute to stability in Iraq.” There were, however, two flies in the ointment. The first was that the dispatch of Turkish forces to Iraq was not yet a done deal, and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan indicated there could be some hard bargaining ahead, saying that “the parliament’s decision is not a decision with immediate effect” and that “use of this authorization will be tied to the result of talks” with the Americans. Moreover, unfortunately for the Americans the Iraqis – Kurds and Arabs alike – were anything but happy with the prospect of Turkish troops returning after an 80-year absence, and it showed. (Iraq, formerly an unwilling part of the Ottoman empire, became a British mandate after the first world war.) The Americans reportedly managed to prevent the 25-member Governing Council (GC) from issuing a formal statement expressing its opposition to the move, but individual members of the GC left little doubt as to the group’s feelings. According to council member Mahmud 'Uthman on 7 October, “the council is unanimous in issuing a communiqué against the sending of Turkish forces to Iraq. It is the wrong thing to do. It does not add to security…This is our position and it is unanimous.” Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari agreed, saying that “the GC does not want any of Iraq’s immediate neighbors to take part in peacekeeping missions.” Even the Pentagon’s favorite Iraqi group, the Iraqi National Congress (INC), came out against the decision, with INC spokesman Intifadh Qanbar saying that “strategically, any foreign troops should be invited by an Iraqi sovereign government. In the short term, it should be decided by the Iraqi GC.” It remains to be seen whether the Americans want to demonstrate international support for their position badly enough to override the clear wishes of the council they themselves appointed. But if they do invite the Turks in, it will do nothing for their already tenuous popularity with Iraqis of all persuasions.
Rice To Head Iraq Stabilization Group
From a distance, it is difficult to know what to make of the 6 October White House announcement that national security adviser Condoleezza Rice is to head an “Iraq Stabilization Group” that will coordinate US efforts on counter-terrorism, economic development, political institutions and communications. To the untrained eye, it looked as if the new group could hardly help intruding on the territory of the neoconservatives in the Pentagon who have so far enjoyed a free hand in Iraq. Yet an unnamed “senior administration official” who is part of the group insisted that it “is in support of the Department of Defense, the Coalition Provisional Authority and the inter-agency process,” and that, for example, the US administrator in Iraq, Paul Bremer, would continue to report to the Pentagon. On the other hand, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld sounded anything but happy when he told the Financial Times on 8 October that he had not been informed of the formation of the stabilization group before the media were briefed on it by National Security Council officials. (Mr Rumsfeld’s account of events is at odds with that of Dr Rice, who told the New York Times that Mr Rumsfeld, Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of State Colin Powell had all been in on the creation of the new group.) Given the contradictory reports emanating from Washington, it would probably be as well to wait and see what the stabilization group’s powers are vis-à-vis the Pentagon and State Department before deciding where it stands in the Iraq hierarchy (or even why its creation was necessary). In the meantime, it can be regarded as yet another instance of the bitter turf battles in Washington that have characterized – and some would say hampered – the process of putting Iraq back together again.
Congress Moves Ahead With Syria Act
For reasons best known to themselves, the Israelis decided to hold Syria responsible for a suicide bombing by Islamic Jihad in Haifa on 4 October that left 19 dead and retaliated with an air attack on what was claimed to be an Islamic Jihad training base 15 kilometers north west of Damascus on 5 October. But if the purpose of the air raid was to tar Syria with the terrorist brush in the eyes of the US, it succeeded. The Americans initially reacted cautiously, with White House spokesman Ken Lisaius saying on 5 October that President Bush had called Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and “they agreed on the need to continue fighting terrorism. They discussed the attack on the terrorist camp in Syria. They also agreed on the need to avoid heightening tension in the region at this time.” But subsequently Mr Bush backed Mr Sharon in terms that Arab commentators saw as tantamount to giving the Israelis the green light for anything they might want to try against Syria, saying on 6 October that “Israel’s got a right to defend herself, that Israel must not feel constrained in terms of defending the homeland” and the next day that “the decisions that he (Mr Sharon) makes to defend her people are valid decisions. We would be doing the same thing.”
The US administration also indicated its displeasure with the Syrians by letting it be known that it would no longer oppose the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Act, which was approved 33-2 by the House Committee on International Relations on 8 October and which – with 274 out of 435 congressmen and 76 out of 100 senators as cosponsors – now appears to stand a good chance of becoming law. (The bill would ban various dual-use US exports to Syria and direct the president to impose two of six specific sanctions – a ban on US exports except food and medicine, a ban on business investment, restrictions on Syrian diplomats, a ban on Syrian airlines in US airspace, a reduction in diplomatic contacts, and a freeze on Syrian assets in the US – on Syria until it ends its support for terrorist groups, withdraws its forces from Lebanon and proves it is not developing medium and long-range missiles and chemical and biological weapons.) All in all, the administration’s attitude towards Syria can now scarcely be distinguished from Israel’s, as White House spokesman Scott McClellan made clear on 8 October when he said that “we have repeatedly said that Syria is on the wrong side in the war on terrorism and that Syria needs to stop harboring terrorists. Frankly the Syrians have done so little with regard to terrorism that we don’t have a lot to work with.”
Charles Snow