VOL. XLVI
No 39
The Political Scene (29 September 2003)
The 23 September meeting of the UN General Assembly produced few surprises, and it looks as if the Americans will get a new UN resolution (of sorts) on Iraq, although not much else by way of help. There is total confusion in Baghdad about radical economic reforms decreed by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and announced by the Iraqi finance minister. In Sudan, the government and the rebel SPLA have taken a major step towards ending the country’s 20-year old civil war.
Few Surprises At The UN
In the run-up to 23 September meeting of the UN General Assembly, the outlook for the Americans’ campaign for a new Security Council resolution clearing the way for a greater international contribution to Iraq’s rehabilitation did not look particularly promising, with both the Americans and the French restating their previous antagonistic positions. US President George Bush even appeared to query the need for a new resolution when he said on 22 September that “I’m not so sure we have to” seek greater UN participation. However, he added that “I think it would be helpful to get the UN in to help write the constitution. I mean, they’re good at that. Or perhaps when an election starts, they’ll oversee the election. That would be a larger role.” On the other side of the issue, French President Jacques Chirac told the New York Times on 22 the same day that France would only vote for the resolution if it included a deadline and timetable for the transfer of sovereignty, as well as a “key role“ for the UN. Otherwise, he said, there would be a “governor who is Christian and foreign” administering an Arab and Muslim country, which is “a very difficult situation for any people to accept in the 21st century.” For the US, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice replied that “the French plan which would somehow try to transfer sovereignty to an unelected group of people just isn’t workable.”
Neither Mr Bush nor Mr Chirac departed from their stated positions when they addressed the General Assembly on 24 September. Mr Bush stressed that “the primary goal of our coalition in Iraq is self-government, reached by orderly and democratic means,” adding pointedly that “this process must unfold according to the needs of the Iraqis, neither hurried nor delayed by the wishes of other parties.” However, he did allow that “the UN can contribute greatly to Iraqi self-government” by assisting in “developing a constitution, training civil servants and conducting free and fair elections.” Mr Chirac for his part suggested that it was up to the UN to legitimize the transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqis, saying that “in Iraq the transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqis, who must have sole responsibility for their destiny, is essential for stability and reconstruction. It is up to the UN to lend legitimacy to that process.” The French president also criticized American unilateralism by declaring that “no-one can be isolated, no-one can act alone in everyone’s name, and no-one can accept the anarchy of a lawless society. There is no alternative to the UN…multilateralism is crucial because it ensures the participation by all in managing the affairs of the world.” In the only surprise of the meeting, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan abandoned his normal neutrality (and very possibly any hopes he may have had of a second term in office) to denounce the US doctrine of preemption. “Until now,” he said, “it has been understood that when states decide to use force to deal with broader threats to international peace and security, they need the unique legitimacy provided by the UN. Now, some say this understanding is no longer tenable, since an armed attack with weapons of mass destruction could be launched at any time, without warning, or by a clandestine group. Rather than wait for that to happen, they argue, states have the obligation to use force pre-emptively, even on the territory of other states. This logic represents a fundamental challenge to the principles on which world peace and stability have rested for the last 58 years.”
A Resolution, Maybe, But No Troops
In the circumstances, it was unsurprising that no-one changed their mind either, with Mr Chirac saying after a meeting with Mr Bush on 23 September that “we believe, and this is what I told President Bush – that today, the situation in Iraq is such that it is very difficult for Iraqis in general to accept a situation that, one way or another, is an occupation. We have to change tack.” However, the next day, after a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, Mr Chirac emphasized that the three leading critics of Washington’s Iraq policy were determined to approach the issue positively, saying “naturally we talked about the preparation of the resolution on Iraq which is due soon in the Security Council. We have concluded that we would like to go about this preparation in a positive and constructive spirit.”
If it looks as if the Americans will now get a resolution of some kind, it is a good deal less certain just how much support in practical (i.e. financial and military) terms they can expect from the international community (and a report in the Financial Times that the European Commission is prepared to commit only a derisory $220mn to the reconstruction of Iraq suggests that the Europeans are not feeling all that helpful). Certainly no-one is rushing to offer to send troops to help the US out. Mr Chirac has ruled out French military assistance, at least in the current circumstances. Mr Schroeder on 24 September pointedly offered only to train Iraqi security forces in Germany. Mr Putin said on 20 September that “in practical terms there is no question of sending any Russian military contingent to Iraq.” And Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf told the General Assembly that “Pakistan would be prepared to help in a collective UN-sanctioned Arab and Islamic effort to help the Iraqi people, if they wish us to do so” – but that was not exactly what the Americans have in mind, at least for the moment.
Bremer Decrees Economic Reform, Iraqis Disagree
To the neoconservatives in Washington, the conquest of Iraq is only the first step in a plan to reshape the whole of the Middle East by creating a liberal, free-market democracy in the heart of the region which other countries will then be forced to emulate. (Never mind that Iraq is not the most promising material for democracy, or that the domino theory may not apply in south west Asia any more than in did in south east Asia. History, after all, is over.) So when Iraqi Finance Minister Kamil al-Gailani announced at the IMF-World Bank meeting in Dubai on 21 September (in a statement apparently released by the US delegation) that a package of economic reforms which might have been written by Adam Smith himself ‒ including, inter alia, allowing 100% foreign ownership of everything except natural resources (for specifics, see B Section) ‒ had been enacted by decree on the same day by US administrator Paul Bremer, it was greeted with an enthusiasm bordering on the rapturous by US officials. The statement announcing the reforms claimed they “would significantly advance efforts to build a free and open market economy in Iraq.” Treasury Secretary John Snow described them on the same day as “a very promising set of policies.” And the next day, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice explained the domino theory when she said that the Iraqis “have an opportunity with low taxation, with liberal foreign investment laws, with very open economic structure, to leapfrog the entire region once the infrastructure is rebuilt. Unless the rest of the region starts to move in that direction, they are going to find Iraq just sprinting past them.”
Mr Snow also claimed that “these are the proposals, ideas and concepts of the Governing Council (GC). The GC was very clear on that; ‘These are our ideas,’” but unfortunately for the Americans, it rapidly became clear that if the members of the American-appointed council had ever agreed to the reforms – which might have been calculated to offend as many sectors of Iraqi society as possible – they changed their mind once they realized what the public reaction was likely to be. There ensued what, to judge from the various accounts, amounted to total confusion in Baghdad. AFP reported that the GC issued a statement on 24 September saying that only the Council president could announce policy “and the statements attributed to the minister about the law of investment cannot be considered official.” Mr Gailani’s version of the reforms “was not precise,” and “after studying the statements attributed to the finance minister and the reaction” the council had decided to set up a committee of experts to review the question of investment and produce a “precise, scientific version that will guarantee the rights of the Iraqi people and serve the high interests of the country.” Reuters said that the council had issued a statement on 25 September describing Mr Gailani’s announcement as “not official and not precise” and saying that “a specialized committee will be formed to study the effects and reactions caused and to discuss details in depth to ensure a precisely worded draft that safeguards the rights of the Iraqi people in a manner that serves the national interests.” And the Financial Times reported that four members of the council held a press conference on 24 September at which one of them, Hamid Majid Musa, said that “the announcement is an exaggeration which is not practical, not feasible, not legal.”
Despite the confusion, it is clear that at the very least there is a difference of opinion between the GC and the CPA, and one that could raise the delicate issue of just what the relative powers of the two bodies are. But as far as the reforms are concerned, the GC probably need not worry too much about a foreign takeover of the Iraqi economy, since it is hard to see why any rational company would risk investing under laws which are so unpopular that they are virtually certain to be repealed by whatever form of sovereign government eventually emerges in Baghdad. Indeed, the question raised by the whole affair is not what effect the reforms will have on the economy but what the Americans hope to achieve by this attempt to preempt Iraq’s economic options.
Sudan And SPLA Sign Security Agreement
After three weeks of talks, Sudanese Vice President 'Ali 'Uthman Muhammad Taha and the leader of the rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), John Garang, signed a security agreement in Naivasha, Kenya on 25 September which by all accounts removes a major obstacle to ending Sudan’s 20-year long civil war. Other issues, such as sharing power and revenue from the southern oil fields, remain to be resolved between the two sides, but for the first time both parties expressed optimism that a settlement could now be reached. Mr Taha said that “we have got miles to cover ahead. What has happened gives us the drive to negotiate on other issues.” According to Mr Garang, “we have responded to the wish of the Sudanese people for a fair and just political settlement that is durable, and this agreement is a basis for such a fair and just settlement.”
Charles Snow