VOL. XLVI
No 38
The Political Scene (22 September 2003)
The US has made little visible headway in its campaign for a new UN resolution on Iraq, while in Iraq itself even Iraqis well disposed toward the Americans are becoming impatient with the slow pace of progress towards a transfer of political power. Syria is once more in the US firing line. The US has, yet again, unsheathed its veto to protect Israel in the Security Council. And the IAEA has set a deadline for Iran to report in greater detail on its nuclear program.
Slow Going At The UN
After an uncertain start, it cannot be said that the US campaign to enlist international military and financial assistance in Iraq under the cover of a new UN resolution was going particularly well. Just prior to meeting with the other members of the Security Council permanent five in Geneva on 13 September, Secretary of State Colin Powell described last week’s Franco-German proposal to hand over to an Iraqi government as early as next month as “totally unrealistic…the US will not accept any proposed UN Security Council resolution which includes such a requirement.” He also claimed that the Security Council’s reaction to the US draft resolution had been “generally supportive,” but added: “There are a couple of members in the council with a slightly different point of view, or a greatly different point of view, that say let’s speed up the transfer of governing authority from the CPA to an Iraqi entity, and let’s make any design of plan for this political transition and a timetable to be a matter between the UN representative and the Governing Council (GC) as it grows into an interim administration. That would not be acceptable to us.” After the Geneva meeting, Mr Powell put a brave face on things, saying that “I will leave this meeting encouraged with the points of convergence but also recognizing that there are still some difficulties and differences that have to be worked out.” Subsequently, however, he described the talks to journalists as “open and frank,” which in the diplomatic lexicon means confrontational and contentious.
Nonetheless, there were signs that the French at least were still anxious to contain their differences with the US as far as possible. French ambassador to the US Jean-David Levitte conceded on 15 September that “it’s not logical that at this early stage we would try prematurely to turn over to the Iraqis sovereignty when they are not yet capable of exercising it,” while calling for “a symbolic transfer of sovereignty over Iraq into the hands of the Governing Council of Iraq – and then, as expeditiously as possible, a transfer of responsibilities into the hands of the ministers as soon as they are ready to exert these responsibilities.” Asked about the possibility of a French veto, Mr Levitte replied: “No, we are working in a very positive spirit…if we are 100% satisfied we’ll say bravo. If not we’ll say well, next time we hope to do a better job.” The Americans were more ambivalent. White House spokesman Scott McClellan said on 17 September that “we listened to some of the issues that were raised by other nations. We’re looking at those issues and we will be getting back to some of those nations.” At the State Department, spokesman Richard Boucher said on the same day “we’re trying to listen carefully to what we’ve heard from other countries, listen carefully to the many helpful suggestions that we’ve gotten…any that are constructive will be incorporated into our thinking.”
It is very much open to doubt
whether French President Jacques Chirac’s comments on 19 September would fall
into the category the Americans would regard as constructive. Mr Chirac said
that “we must move as quickly as possible towards…the rapid transfer, under the
control of the UN, of the responsibilities of government to the current
governmental bodies in Iraq. And when I say as rapidly as possible, it is for us
a question of months and not years naturally.” That was a concession of sorts
from the previous French position that a provisional government should be set up
in Baghdad within a month, but almost certainly not enough of one for the
Americans. (The reference to UN control, in particular, was unlikely to go down
well in Washington.) All in all, Mr Bush was probably understating it when he
said on 18 September that there would “probably not” be a new UN resolution by
the time he addressed the General Assembly on 23 September.
Iraqis Restive
Meanwhile, even Iraqis amicably disposed towards the US – very possibly emboldened by French calls for a rapid transfer of authority – have been voicing their impatience with lack of progress towards a political accommodation on the ground. The elder statesman of the US-appointed GC, 'Adnan Pachachi, said in Geneva on 13 September that “we would like the interim Iraqi government or the GC to have greater responsibilities, especially now that we have appointed ministers.” The current president of the 25-member Council (and Pentagon protégé), Iraqi National Congress (INC) leader Ahmad Chalabi, said on 14 September that “there must be a move forward to sovereignty for Iraq. We want to work with the international community to achieve that as soon as possible.” Mr Chalabi added that a restoration of sovereignty “would make the Americans look like liberators again…Iraqi people don’t understand the logic of occupation.” A senior official of the Shi'a Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), 'Adil 'Abd al-Mahdi, echoed these views, saying on 14 September that “we’re in a very dangerous situation now. What prevents us from moving forward is this idea of occupation. Iraq cannot be governed if Iraqis don’t get more responsibility.”
Significant as the differences between the Council members and the US may turn out to be in the long run, the most telling critique of the Americans’ handling of the post-war situation in Iraq, and of American viceroy Paul Bremer, came from a respected political figure who is widely believed to have been excluded from the American-appointed Council because he was too independent, former Industry Minister and head of the Iraq National Oil Company Adib al-Jadir. Dr Jadir, who is probably nearest thing to a loyal opposition leader in Iraq today, told the Saudi daily al-Watan on 16 September that the GC had no right to make free with the country’s capabilities, since if the occupying power did not have sovereignty over Iraq under a UN resolution or the Geneva conventions, neither did the council appointed by the occupiers. “Iraq’s sovereignty,” he said, “is currently frozen until such time as an elected constituent assembly approves a constitution and a parliament is elected under UN supervision that can choose a national government.” Mr Jadir went on to describe Mr Bremer as “an autocrat” and “an arrogant person who speaks of himself as a liberator and acts as an occupier who looks down on the Governing Council and the UN.” He also noted that the budget and its allocations were approved by an advisory board (the Program Review Board – see MEES, 7 July) regarded as the real finance ministry, most of whose members are American, and that “when some members of the Governing Council asked or pleaded to participate in the advisory board, Bremer promised to appoint four members, but without the right to vote.” As for the actual ministry, “it functions without money, a budget or power.”
Syria Again In US Sights
After a brief hiatus, and as Congress, with its penchant for legislating foreign policy, began to debate the ponderously named Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act, the US administration has resumed its verbal assaults on Syria as a sort of second-tier member of the axis of evil. During a stopover in Kuwait on 15 September, Mr Powell told reporters that Syria was not doing enough to end its support of “terrorist activity,” including cross border infiltration into Iraq and that “so far, the Syrian leadership has not responded as forcefully and as thoroughly as I would have liked.” He said that during his May visit to Damascus “I made it clear to the Syrians that to have good relations with the US and with a liberated Iraq, they should do everything they could to make sure that the wrong sorts of people are not crossing the border to cause trouble in Iraq.” He had also emphasized that US demands included “an end to support of terrorist activity and that they should eject those individuals in Damascus who are connected to terrorist organizations.” And, bizarrely, he also revealed that he had asked the Syrians to “help us with financial records and any bank accounts that might be held by the former (Iraqi) regime in Syrian banks.” (For one thing, even Syrians avoid the Syrian banking system if they can. For another, if Saddam and his cronies had been foolish enough to remit their ill-gotten gains to or through Syria, they would have been expropriated faster than you can say ‘Arab Ba'th Socialist Party.’)
However, the harshest criticism of the Syrians came from Undersecretary of State John Bolton, who told the House International Relations Subcommittee 16 September that “Syria allowed military equipment to flow into Iraq on the eve of and during the war. Syria permitted volunteers to pass into Iraq to attack and kill our service members during the war, and is still doing so.” Mr Bolton went on to assert that “although Damascus has increased its cooperation regarding Iraq since the fall of the Iraqi regime, its behavior during Operation Iraqi Freedom underscores the importance of taking seriously reports and information on Syria’s WMD capabilities,” and that “while there is currently no information indicating that the Syrian government has transferred WMD to terrorist organizations or would permit such groups to acquire them, Syria’s ties to numerous terrorist groups underlie the reasons for our continued anxiety.” And he warned rogue states in general that “if the language of persuasion fails, these states must see and feel the logic of adverse consequences.”
Faced with this onslaught, Syrian Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shara' on 16 September suggested, in a tactful manner, that the Americans should perhaps not blame others for their problems, saying: “The Americans are now our neighbors and they should care for their neighbors and take into consideration the sensitivity of the Syrians and Arabs. We wish that this super power which considers itself as the leader of the free world and democracy in the world to stay as such and not to turn into a third world-like regime in Iraq blaming neighbors for all the troubles it faces in Iraq…this is unreasonable and unfair.” But he also said that “the American demands are very numerous, but Syria is ready to cooperate if these demands turn out to be logical and realistic. Syria will be at the head of countries that cooperate with the US if the demands come within the framework of international legality, in favor of Iraq and with a view to finding a just solution to the (Arab-Israeli) conflict.” However, conciliatory remarks such as these were not enough to placate the Americans in their present mood, and White House spokesman Scott McClellan warned sternly on 16 September that “we’ve made it very clear to Syria what they need to do, that their behavior is unacceptable and that they need to change their behavior…states that harbor terror, as the president has made clear, will be held accountable.”
For The Umpteenth Time…
Israeli Industry and Trade Minister (and vice premier) Ehud Olmert followed up the 11 September cabinet decision to remove Palestinian leader Yasir 'Arafat “in a manner and at a time which will be decided afterwards” by stating explicitly on 14 September that “killing is definitely one of the options. We are trying to eliminate the heads of terror, and 'Arafat is one of the heads of terror.” This went too far for Mr Powell, who said the next day that “the US does not support either the elimination of him or the exile of Mr 'Arafat…the Israeli government knows that.” It even went too far for Mr Olmert’s own government, with Foreign Minister Silvan Sharon claiming that assassinating Mr 'Arafat “is not the official policy of the Israeli government. It never has been” and that “the cabinet decision is not for immediate action.” This disclaimer did very little to persuade the Arabs that Mr Olmert was not telling the truth, particularly since the Israelis have openly espoused assassination in their campaign against Hamas and other Palestinian groups and have reverted to referring obsessively to Mr 'Arafat as a terrorist. (In a particularly blatant example of this kind of overheated rhetoric, Israeli UN ambassador Dan Gillerman claimed on 16 September that Mr 'Arafat “is at the helm of those who have been supporting mega-terror attacks in the style of the bombing of the twin towers.”) The Syrians therefore submitted a draft resolution to the Security Council on 16 September demanding that “Israel, the occupying power, desist from any act of deportation and cease any threat to the safety of the elected president of the Palestinian Authority.” The draft also expressed “grave concern” at recent violence, said that attacks on both sides had “caused enormous suffering and many innocent victims” and called for “the complete cessation of all acts of violence, including all acts of terror, provocation, incitement and destruction.” That was good enough for 11 council members, including Russia, France and China, to vote in favor and three – Britain, Germany and Bulgaria – to abstain. But it was not good enough for the Americans, who promptly vetoed the resolution on the grounds that, as ambassador John Negroponte put it, it did not “take a clear stand against…or call for decisive action against” Palestinian groups such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade.” The Arabs, as is their wont, then took their resolution to the General Assembly, which was due to vote on it as MEES went to press on 19 September, and it can be predicted with some confidence that it will be passed by a huge majority of the Assembly’s 191 members, with possibly three votes against – the US, Israel and Vanuatu.
IAEA Sets Deadline For Iran
Iran’s reaction to the 12 September resolution passed by the 35-member governing board of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) setting a 31 October deadline for Iran to remedy past “failures…to report material, facilities and activities” relating to its nuclear program was ambivalent. (Inter alia, the resolution said that it was “essential and urgent…that Iran remedy all failures identified by the Agency and cooperate fully with the Agency by taking all necessary actions by the end of October 2003.” It also asked Iran “to work with the Secretariat to promptly and unconditionally sign, ratify and fully implement the additional protocol” to the Non Proliferation Treaty.) On the same day, Iran’s ambassador to the UN in Vienna, Ali Akbar Salehi, declared that “we will have no choice but to have a deep review of our existing level and extent of engagement with the agency vis-à-vis this resolution,” while insisting that Iran “is a fervent subscriber to the NPT, a loyal party to it and a staunch promoter of the Middle East as a nuclear-free zone.” By 14 September, however, Mr Salehi had cooled off somewhat and said that “we will continue our cooperation with the IAEA as before and our clear criticism does not mean we will sever our cooperation with the agency,” although he added that Iran should not show “total obedience to the West’s demands,” as that “could pave the way for unlimited demands.” On the same day, Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi told reporters that “the nature of our cooperation with the IAEA is under consideration. The relevant authorities are discussing that and our decision will be made public in the future.” And on 15 September Iranian Vice-President Gholamreza Aghazadeh gave a similar message in a statement to the IAEA which said “we have serious problems with this resolution. From its inconsistency with the NPT to its deadline for cooperation and its venomous language are all problematic. These are our preliminary views on this resolution. We are studying the resolution carefully and will officially respond to it in a few days.” The Iranians’ hesitation is no doubt attributable to the fact that defiance of the IAEA is likely to come at a cost, since although Russia and the EU decline to join the US in confronting Iran across the board, they are both behind the Americans on the nuclear issue. What is at stake, therefore, could be Iran’s good relations with Russia, its nascent rapprochement with Europe and even a possible recourse to the Security Council if Iran does not meet the IAEA’s demands.
Charles Snow