VOL. XLVI
No 29
The Political Scene (21 July 2003)
As guerrilla attacks on coalition forces in Iraq escalate, the CPA-appointed Governing Council has met for the first time. Palestinian leader Yasir 'Arafat and Prime Minister Mahmud 'Abbas have settled their differences with an agreement giving Mr 'Arafat considerable influence behind the scenes in peace negotiations and security matters.
Governing Council Meets
With the number of attacks on coalition forces in Iraq now averaging 13 a day – including a SAM attack on an American military aircraft on 15 July – the new US military commander, Gen John Abizaid, was only stating the obvious when he said on 16 July that US troops were facing a “classical guerrilla-type campaign…It’s a low-intensity conflict in our doctrinal terms, but it’s war, however you describe it.” Nonetheless, this was a fairly startling turn of phrase for an administration that had so far avoided like the plague any language that might remind people at home of Vietnam. It might also be seen as an acknowledgement that rising casualties and costs – not to mention the failure to find any WMD or connection with al-Qa'ida – are leading people to question whether the occupation of Iraq was quite the victory it was made out to be and threatening to turn the war from a political asset into a millstone around the administration’s neck. That being so, the first meeting of the 25-member Iraqi Governing Council on 13 July was a hopeful development from the American point of view as at least potentially the first step towards the goal – admittedly distant – of an eventual American withdrawal. It is true that Iraq’s first interim government was appointed by the Coalition Political Authority (CPA), but no-one inside or outside the country was suggesting that it did not authentically represent Iraq’s confessional and ethnic make-up (with 13 Shi'a members, 5 Sunnis, 5 Kurds, 1 Turkmen and 1 Christian). It is also true that its decisions – which include the appointment of ministers and international representatives and the selection of a committee to draft a constitution – are in the final analysis subject to the veto of US administrator Paul Bremer. But it is hard to see how Mr Bremer could exercise that veto without appearing to be the viceroy the Americans insist he is not. Or, as one of the more respected members of the council, former foreign minister 'Adnan Pachachi, put it, “I don’t foresee Mr Bremer will ever cast a veto against the council. I don’t think there’s any reason for resorting to a veto.”
'Arafat And 'Abbas Settle Differences
The Israelis may have persuaded the Americans to go along with their attempt to marginalize Palestinian leader Yasir 'Arafat into oblivion by refusing to talk to him, but the Europeans in general and the British in particular are refusing to allow Israel to determine who they deal with. Shortly after Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, during a visit to England, accused European leaders on 14 July of undermining Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmud 'Abbas by continuing to talk to Mr 'Arafat, a Foreign Office spokeswoman announced that “we made it clear that the UK position, which is also that of the EU, is that we will continue to have dealings with Mr 'Arafat, who is the democratically elected president of the Palestinian Authority (PA).” Mr Sharon’s campaign to render Mr 'Arafat “irrelevant” suffered a further setback when the PA president and Mr 'Abbas managed on 14 July to compose the differences that had led Mr 'Abbas to threaten to resign on 7 July. (Mr 'Abbas had come under fire from Mr 'Arafat and his allies for failing to win any substantial concessions from the Israelis in return for the cease-fire declared by the main Palestinian groups.) Under the agreement, a PLO committee grouping the two leaders and several longtime associates of Mr 'Arafat will set guidelines for Mr 'Abbas’s negotiations with Israel. And a second committee composed of Security Minister Muhammad Dahlan and a number of 'Arafat appointees will be set up to oversee Mr Dahlan’s activities. The two committees clearly represent constraints on Mr 'Abbas’s and Mr Dahlan’s freedom of action and as such could be seen as a victory for Mr 'Arafat. But the truth is that the two Palestinian leaders need each other, since without Mr 'Arafat’s backing, Mr 'Abbas lacks the constituency to deliver a deal, and without Mr 'Abbas, Mr 'Arafat has no means of communication with the Israelis and Americans. And while this arrangement may appear to meet the Israelis’ demand that Mr 'Arafat be removed from the loop, in fact it appears that, like it or not, the Israelis are going to be dealing with Mr 'Arafat through Mr 'Abbas.
Charles Snow