VOL. XLVI
No 20
19
The Political Scene (19 May 2003)
The Americans appear to be shifting their emphasis in Iraq from reviving the country’s political life to more practical and immediate issues (such as security). They have also been less than totally sympathetic after lethal al-Qa’ida attacks in Riyadh. The Israelis have more or less ignored Secretary of State Colin Powell’s first attempt to promote the international “road map” to peace.
US Thinks Again
Against the background of continuing near-anarchy in Baghdad, the abrupt departure of the US official previously in charge of the capital and central Iraq, Barbara Bodine, on 11 May and the arrival of the new civilian supremo, Paul Bremer, on 12 May served to underline that American policy is undergoing a major reevaluation. Sources in Baghdad indicate to MEES that the Americans may have decided to move the process of resuscitating Iraqi political life onto the back burner and to concentrate instead on more practical (and pressing) problems such as energy supplies, the financial system, security and law and order. (One indication that this may be so is that the national congress to select an interim government, which was supposed to be held sometime in the next few weeks, has for the moment receded rapidly into the background.) In other words, the Americans may have finally decided to act like occupiers rather than liberators. This is an assessment which is certainly consistent with the revised draft resolution on lifting sanctions which the Americans presented to the Security Council on 15 May. For reasons that are not immediately apparent, this starts out by noting that the Council is acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (which permits the use of force). It then, inter alia: “supports the formation, by the people of Iraq with the help of the Authority” – ie the US and UK – “and working with the (UN) Special Coordinator, of an Iraqi interim authority as a transitional administration run by Iraqis until an internationally recognized representative government is established by the people of Iraq;” establishes “a Development Fund for Iraq to be held by the Central Bank of Iraq” into which all proceeds from exports of oil and gas shall be paid “until such time as an internationally recognized representative government of Iraq is properly constituted,” to be “disbursed at the direction of the Authority, in consultation with the Iraqi interim authority;” and “endorses the exercise of the responsibilities stated in this resolution by the Authority for an initial period of 12 months from the date of the adoption of this resolution, to continue thereafter as necessary unless the Security Council decides otherwise.”
It is not very hard
to see what the flaws are in this resolution from the Iraqi point of view. For
one thing, it proposes the establishment of an Iraqi interim authority rather
than a provisional government, which Iraqi opposition sources regard as a
violation of previous US commitments. Moreover, it is an interim authority whose
formation and powers are described in terms so vague as to be virtually
meaningless. As for the Development Fund, it is true that it comes sugar coated
with “an international advisory board…whose members shall include duly qualified
representatives of the Special Coordinator, of the Managing Director of the IMF,
of the Director General of the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development,
and of the President of the World Bank” but the bitter pill under the sugar
coating is Authority control of Iraqi oil revenues qualified only by the need to
“consult” with the interim authority. And, of course, the default setting for
the exercise of the Authority’s considerable powers is on rather than off,
meaning in effect that once the resolution is passed, it will remain in force
for as long as the Americans want. These objections were summed up on 14 May by
Jalal Talabani, the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and one of the
more pro-American politicians in Iraq, when he said that the resolution “goes
against Iraqi national sovereignty. It is not in the interest of the US, which
has freed Iraq, to appear as an occupying state preventing the Iraqi people from
exercising its sovereignty and independence. It shows the US and Britain
backtracking on pledges we have heard repeatedly.” No doubt that is true, but it
is equally true that the US holds all the cards in Baghdad at the moment, and if
the Americans allow an interim authority that is broadly representative to be
selected “by the people of Iraq” (whatever that means), most Iraqi politicians
will go along with it, however reluctantly. On the other hand, if the Americans
play favorites and try to exclude political trends that are not to their liking
from the interim authority, there could be trouble ahead.
Al-Qa’ida Strikes In Saudi Arabia
After Saudi security forces fought a gun battle with terrorists believed to be members of al-Qa’ida in Riyadh on 6 May, Interior Minister Prince Nayif ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz said that the large quantity of explosives that had been seized “is very disturbing and indicates how dangerous these people are,” adding that “the presence of such highly advanced explosives indicates that they had been planning to destroy buildings or big places.” These remarks turned out to be all too true when less than a week later al-Qa’ida suicide bombers simultaneously attacked three compounds housing foreigners in Riyadh on 12 May, killing 34 people and wounding hundreds of others. There was no doubt at all that, in the words of US ambassador Robert Jordan on 15 May, “this…was aimed at undermining the government, the regime, as much as it was an attack on American interests,” and as such the attack sent ripples through oil markets and shivers down spines elsewhere in the Gulf. It might be thought that the logical conclusion for the Americans to draw would be that the two countries are essentially in the same boat as far as al-Qa’ida is concerned. (Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Sa’ud al-Faisal on 14 May expressed the hope that “accusations in the US about the responsibility of Saudi Arabia in the 9/11 tragedy will cease,” since “nobody can hold us responsible for attacking our own country.”) The neo-conservatives in Washington might also conclude that regime change in Saudi Arabia might not be such a good idea after all. But the American reaction was curiously unsympathetic. White House spokesman Ari Fleischer, it is true, said on 14 May that “the president is pleased with the cooperation we have had from Saudi Arabia, not only in this instance, but since really the war on terror began,” but he also said that “the fact is that Saudi Arabia must deal with the fact that it has terrorists inside its own country” and that the Saudis must “do more” to root out terrorists at home. (He also read pointedly from a 1 May State Department warning that the US believed terrorists were in “the final phases” of planning attacks in the Kingdom.) National Security adviser Condoleezza Rice sounded a similar “could do better if they tried” note when she said that “there is hard work ahead. We have had good cooperation with the Saudi government and I am sure that in the wake of this terrible incident in Riyadh we will seek to intensify our cooperation.” And when Mr Jordan predicted in a TV interview on 14 May that the Saudis would now redouble their efforts to “be a true partner” in the global campaign against terror, the clear, if undiplomatic, implication was that so far they had not been.
The Road Map’s First Outing
US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s first foray into the region with the recently unveiled “road map” to peace cannot be said to have been a major navigational success. Upon his arrival in Israel on 10 May he opined that the war in Iraq had removed “one of the strategic threats in the region, especially to the state of Israel,” which was generally taken to mean that Israel could now afford to be more flexible towards the Palestinians. But if so, he was swiftly disabused by Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom, who said that it was the Palestinians who should now be making concessions. “After the war in Iraq, the game is changed,” he said after meeting with Mr Powell. “There are new rules and they will have to adopt a new way of behavior to move towards peace. A new approach must bring them to realize that the change must come.” And after Israel lifted travel restrictions on Palestinians on 11 May Powell seized on the gesture with an alacrity that suggested a certain amount of desperation, claiming that “the steps that the prime minister mentioned to me are very promising and very helpful and show Israel’s commitment to begin this process and not lose this moment of opportunity. I’m pleased that the prime minister has confirmed Israel’s intention to take positive steps in the days ahead.” Unfortunately, however, the Israelis reversed themselves less than 24 hours later ‒ even as Mr Powell was claiming in Cairo that the new Israeli measures “constitute the beginning of the road map process” ‒ by clamping a total military closure on Gaza. Mr Powell had no better luck on the contentious issue of settlements after announcing on 10 May that “we expect settlement activity to end and I believe we have had extensive assurances from the Israeli government that is their position as well.” (According to the road map, by the end of this month Israel “immediately dismantles settlement outposts erected since March 2001” and “freezes all settlement activity, including natural growth of settlements.”) Mr Sharon’s response, in an interview published on 13 May, was to note - correctly, as it happens – that in the past all Israeli governments had continued settlement activity even during peace negotiations, and that “in my mind, this is not an issue on the horizon right now.” He also denied that the Americans were exerting any pressure on Israel on the issue, saying “it is not something today that anyone is dealing with. All the descriptions about the pressures – there is no pressure from anyone.” Mr Powell, who may have been somewhat put out by Mr Sharon’s airy dismissal of his “extensive assurances,” insisted on 13 May that the Israelis “have some comments on the road map and we will listen to their comments but we do not plan to rewrite or renegotiate the road map…Israel knows that the road map lays out steps that have to be taken.” He also noted that Mr Sharon is due to visit Washington next week and that “we will see where we will go after that exchange of views.” To judge from the two sides’ performance so far, the answer to that is likely to be “nowhere.”
Charles Snow