VOL. XLVI
No 12
After signally failing to obtain Security Council backing for the use of force, the US issued an ultimatum of its own to Iraqi President Saddam Husain and opened hostilities with an attempt to kill the Iraqi leader on 20 March. Turkey has belatedly and reluctantly (and perhaps conditionally) opened its airspace to the Americans. President Bush, for whatever reasons, has suddenly rediscovered an interest in the quartet’s road map to regional peace, while the Palestinians have appointed a prime minister who appears to meet Washington’s requirements.
US Attacks
For an assault that was supposed to be of such ferocity as to awe the Iraqis into submission, the opening stages of the American military campaign against Iraq were a curiously low-key affair. After apparently jumping the gun with an air attack on “targets of opportunity” (i.e. President Saddam Husain and other senior officials) in Baghdad early on 20 March, the American-led coalition followed up with a desultory bombardment of other targets during the day, followed at night by the movement of an undisclosed number of ground forces into undisclosed locations in south Iraq. By MEES press time on 21 March few further details had emerged and no major clashes with Iraqi forces had been reported.
It cannot be said that the Americans had embarked on what – if the neoconservatives in Washington are to be believed – promises to be the most radical restructuring of the Middle East since the fall of the Ottoman empire with anything like the full backing of the international community (despite unconvincing claims to the contrary). Indeed, in the week preceding the outbreak of hostilities the Bush administration presided over what might fairly be described as a diplomatic debacle crowning weeks of efforts to persuade or coerce the Security Council into endorsing the use of force. Mr Bush, who surprised everyone by rediscovering the quartet’s “road map” to Mideast peace on 14 March (see below), reiterated after a meeting in the Azores with British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar on 16 March that the US intended to go for a vote at the UN and let the chips fall where they may, saying that “we concluded that tomorrow is a moment of truth for the world. Many nations have voiced a commitment to peace and security, and now they must demonstrate that commitment to peace and security in the only effective way, by supporting the immediate and unconditional disarmament of Saddam Husain.” Yet after testing which way the wind was blowing in the Security Council the next day, British ambassador Jeremy Greenstock announced that after consultations with other members, the co-sponsors had concluded that “council consensus will not be possible” and that “given those circumstances, the co-sponsors have agreed that we will not pursue a vote on the draft UK-US-Spanish resolution.” US ambassador John Negroponte insisted that “we believe that the vote would have been close. We regret that in the face of an explicit threat to veto by a permanent member, the vote counting became a secondary consideration.” But observers in New York were virtually unanimous that if the Americans could have found the nine positive votes required to pass the resolution, they would have insisted on putting the matter to a vote in order to force a French veto and claim a “moral” victory. The withdrawal of the draft was therefore seen as an admission that the US campaign to win over the uncommitted votes on the council had failed by a substantial margin. That, of course, did not deter the Americans from issuing an ultimatum of their own, with Mr Bush going on TV on 17 March to assert that “the US has the sovereign authority to use force in assuring its own national security” and to declare that “the decades of deceit and cruelty have now reached an end. Saddam Husain and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours. Their refusal to do so will result in military conflict, commenced at the time of our choosing.”
Reluctant Turks Open Airspace
Of all the developments in the last month, the most surprising has perhaps been Turkey’s reluctance to jump on the American bandwagon. One month ago, the Americans, along with everyone else, were assuming that despite domestic opposition to the war on Iraq, the Turks would in the end allow US forces more or less unlimited access to Turkish territory, airspace and facilities for the planned second front in north Iraq in exchange for a package of economic and political incentives. And when the Turkish parliament voted down a motion to this effect on 1 March, it was equally widely assumed that the ruling AKP party would resubmit the motion to the assembly in short order and that it would pass second time around. Yet as the days passed, it became clear that AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan was in no particular hurry to accommodate the Americans. Indeed, as late as 14 March, when he became prime minister, Mr Erdogan indicated that the question of helping the Americans out “is not on our agenda at the moment.” By 18 March, presumably under considerable pressure from the US and the Turkish military establishment, Mr Erdogan acknowledged that “despite differences on the Iraqi crisis, the fundamental strategic and political reality is the alliance between Turkey and the US. Our government considers it important to act in a manner appropriate to the importance and function of our alliance with the US.” And on 20 March the parliament in Ankara belatedly approved a motion allowing the US access to Turkish airspace but not to Turkish bases, even for refueling purposes. White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said somewhat grudgingly that “we appreciate Turkey’s acting as they have,” but also made it clear that “there had been discussion of a package of aid for Turkey that was contingent on Turkey’s acceptance of a total cooperation package. That did not develop and that package is not on the table and that package will not be on the table.” Moreover, in the same motion parliament granted permission for Turkish forces to deploy in north Iraq, apparently without American approval, since State Department spokesman Richard Boucher warned on the same day that “we remain opposed to unilateral action by Turkey or by any party in northern Iraq…We expect the Turkish government, as well as the Iraqi parties, to be responsive to our concerns.” (The Turks apparently expected the Americans to be similarly responsive to theirs, since it was reported on 21 March that US overflights were being delayed even further by negotiations on “technical details” and differences over the movement of Turkish troops into Iraq.) Turkish and American officials continued to insist that further cooperation was possible. Mr Powell, for instance, said on 19 March that “my colleagues at the Defense Department still feel that there are things Turkey can do at some distance in the future.” But there was no disguising the fact that mere access to Turkish airspace was a far cry from the permission to deploy 62,000 ground troops and all their equipment which the Americans originally sought and took for granted, or that Turkey’s reluctance to jump on the US bandwagon must have prompted a major last-minute rethink of the Americans’ war plans both on land and in the air. Mr Erdogan has thus turned out to be a good deal less amenable to American demands (and probably a good deal more Islamic) than appearances originally suggested.
Bush Dusts Off Road Map: Palestinians Appoint Prime Minister
Given subsequent developments, it was virtually inevitable that Mr Bush’s sudden rediscovery on 14 March of the “road map” to an Israeli-Palestinian peace drawn up by the international quartet (the US, UN, EU and Russia) would be seen as both a concession to his beleaguered European allies and a cynical attempt to soften the regional impact of the coming assault on Iraq. Certainly his opening assertion that “we have reached a hopeful moment for progress towards the vision of Middle Eastern peace that I outlined last June…when two states, Israel and Palestine, will live side by side in peace and security” appeared to have little basis in reality. Nonetheless Mr Bush went on to declare that “the Palestinian state must be a reformed and peaceful and democratic state that abandons for ever the use of terror. The government of Israel, as the terror threat is removed and security improves, must take concrete steps to support the emergence of a viable and credible Palestinian state, and to work as quickly as possible toward a final status agreement. As progress is made toward peace, settlement activity in the occupied territories must end.” Noting that “the Palestinian Authority (PA) has created the new position of prime minister,” Mr Bush said that “to be a credible and responsible partner, the new Palestinian prime minister must hold a position of real authority” and that “immediately upon confirmation” of the appointment of such a Palestinian prime minister, “the road map for peace will be given to the Palestinians and the Israelis. This road map will set forth a sequence of steps towards the goals I set out on 24 June 2002.”
The Palestinians, who have accepted the road map more or less in toto, moved a step closer to meeting the quartet’s criteria on 18 March when the Palestinian parliament voted 69 to 1 against an attempt by PA President Yasir 'Arafat to retain the authority to veto cabinet appointments by the prime minister. (However, Mr 'Arafat nonetheless retains ultimate control over security and the peace process.) This move was given a qualified welcome in Washington, where Mr Powell said on 18 March that “we would have preferred to see even greater authority vested in a prime minister, but it is nevertheless a positive step,” while on the same day an unnamed senior State Department official, when asked if the newly created office met the Americans’ standards, replied “real authority is met, now we have to have a prime minister.” He did not have to wait very long, as it was announced on 19 March that the Secretary General of the PLO’s Executive Committee, Mahmud 'Abbas (aka Abu Mazen), had agreed to become the first Palestinian prime minister. That would appear to put the onus squarely on the Americans to unveil the much-delayed road map.
However, just because the Palestinians have appointed a prime minister and the Americans have said they will present their map, it does not necessarily mean that the peace process is back on track. Unfortunately – and to the dismay of the Europeans – Mr Bush also said that “once this road map is delivered, we will expect and welcome contributions from Israel and the Palestinians to this document that will advance true peace.” In other words, the road map, which started out as a more or less take-it-or-leave-it proposition, has now become negotiable, and since Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has made it clear on a number of occasions that he regards the quartet and all its works as irrelevant, this opens the way for the Israelis to talk the road map to death. Indeed, Israeli government spokesman Yonatan Peled on 14 March put the emphasis firmly on discussion rather than acceptance, saying “we basically see eye to eye with President Bush on the importance of the Palestinian prime minister. And once there is a new Palestinian premier and once he begins taking action, then the road map is definitely something which we plan to discuss.” But whatever the long-term outlook for the road map, in the immediate future it is likely to be put back in the glove compartment for the duration of hostilities with Iraq. And once the war is over, it is entirely possible that the Americans will be less enthusiastic about it than they were before the war began.
Charles Snow