The Political Scene (10 March 2003)

The Turkish parliament has refused to endorse the deal allowing US ground forces into the country for six months, and Russia and France are more or less openly threatening to veto any UN resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq, but neither of these setbacks appears to have dented the Americans’ determination to go to war. The Americans are also at odds with the Iraqi opposition on a number of issues.

Turkey’s Parliament Surprises Everyone

Everyone expected that once the bargaining was over, the Turkish parliament would rubber stamp the agreement submitted to it by the government under which, in exchange for American financial and political commitments, some 62,000 US troops would be allowed into Turkey for a six-month period. So sure of the outcome was the US State Department that it had even prepared a statement – subsequently described as “no longer operative” - welcoming a positive vote which, inter alia, declared that “we applaud the courageous leadership of the Turkish government. This vote is a further sign of the strong strategic partnership between our countries and our joint commitment to ensure that the Iraqi regime complies with UN Security Council resolution 1441 and eliminates its weapons of mass destruction.” In the event, though, everyone was wrong, and when the motion came to a vote on 1 March it failed by three votes to muster the required majority of 267. (Of the 533 deputies present, 264 voted in favor, 250 voted against and 19 abstained.) The Americans had little choice but to put a brave face on it, with various Pentagon officials insisting that if the US were denied access to Turkey, there were military alternatives. (That may be, but it is clearly going to require some fast rethinking by military planners, who were presumably taken as much by surprise as anyone else.) As White House spokesman Ari Fleischer put it on 3 March, “the vote was a surprise, the outcome was a surprise, to Turkish officials as well as to American officials.” Mr Fleischer added that “while there are other ways to accomplish military objectives and military success…the preferred outcome would have been for a successful vote.” Meanwhile, at the State Department spokesman Richard Boucher made it clear on the same day that the aid element in the agreement, reportedly involving some $6bn in grants, was now inoperative as well, saying that “as far as this particular package, most of it was predicated on helping Turkey meet the cost of involvement…therefore I’d have to say that much of that would not occur if there was no involvement.”

In view of the slim margin by which the motion failed, attention immediately focused on whether the government would resubmit it to parliament in the near future. The leader of the ruling AKP party, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has displayed a curiously detached attitude towards the proposed agreement throughout, was scrupulously non-committal on 2 March when he said that “this issue is being evaluated by the party leadership and government. If deemed necessary, this step will be taken.” However, the prospects for a second vote brightened perceptibly when the army chief of staff, Gen Hilmi Ozkok, declared on 5 March that “the position of the Turkish armed forces is the same as that of the government. Unfortunately our choice here is not between good and bad, but between bad and worse…if we do not participate, we will suffer the same war damage, but it will never be possible to compensate for it and have a say after the war.” (Somewhat more cryptically, he added that “all that I wish now is that the stance we chose in order to avoid a war will not force us to undertake certain acts at the expense of confronting the warring parties.”) As the general pointed out, the argument that Turkey must deal itself in at the beginning if it wants to be a player at the end of the game remains as compelling as ever, so it would probably be premature to rule out an agreement with the Americans. One scenario currently being mooted is that after Mr Erdogan wins a parliamentary seat in a by-election on 9 March and takes over as prime minister, the motion is resubmitted to parliament. Assuming it passes second time around, it would then take some two weeks to position the American forces (currently waiting on ships off the Turkish coast) to move into northern Iraq. If this is in fact how things go, therefore, the effect of the Turkish parliament’s surprise rejection of the agreement with the US will have been to delay the assault on Iraq by a week or two – and time is beginning to run short.

Security Council Rifts Widen

At MEES press time on 7 March, the Security Council was about to begin hearing the latest progress report from UN chief weapons inspector Hans Blix in a session being held, at France’s insistence, at foreign minister level. As in his previous reports Mr Blix is expected to provide neither the smoking gun on Iraq’s failure to disarm which the Americans and British would like him to produce nor the clean bill of health which most of the rest of the council would like to see. The contents of Mr Blix’s report, therefore, are unlikely to help resolve the differences within the council, which have if anything become more entrenched in the last week and now appear to be heading towards some kind of denouement.

The Americans’ chances of securing the passage of the draft resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq which they tabled last week suffered a setback when Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov told the BBC on 4 March that “if the situation so demands, Russia will of course use its right of veto as an extreme measure. Russia would not support any decision that would directly or indirectly lead to a war with Iraq.” Mr Ivanov also indicated that abstention was not an option as far as Moscow is concerned, saying that “the Iraq question is precisely the sort of question when permanent members of the Security Council should not abstain.” And the draft resolution’s prospects looked even dimmer after the Russian, French and German foreign ministers issued a joint declaration on 5 March which came as close as it is possible to come without using the word “veto” to saying that Russia and France would veto the resolution. In it the ministers call on the Iraqis “to cooperate more actively with the inspectors” and “ask that the inspections now be speeded up, in keeping with the proposals put forward in the memorandum submitted to the Security Council by our three countries,” adding: “In these circumstances, we will not let a proposed resolution pass that would authorize the use of force. Russia and France, as permanent members of the Security Council, will assume all their responsibilities on this point.” Moreover the next day China for the first time associated itself unambiguously with the Franco/Russian/German position when Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan said that “China’s position is consistent with the joint statement. China endorses and supports the content of the joint statement.”

There was some talk from the British towards the end of the week of amending the language of the resolution in an attempt to win over the undecided members of the council. But with the window of military opportunity narrowing, the Americans now appear determined to force the issue at the UN and to ignore the UN if the vote does not go their way. That was the unequivocal message from President George Bush’s 6 March press conference, at which he said that “we are days away from resolving this issue at the Security Council” and that the US will call for a vote on the new resolution “no matter what the whip count is.” Once again, Mr Bush measured the relevance of the UN by the extent of its support for the US position, saying that “we want to see people stand up and say what their opinion is about Saddam Husain and the utility of the UN Security Council.” And once again he indicated that the US will ignore any UN decision which is not to its liking, asserting that “if we need to act, we will act and we really don’t need the UN’s approval to do so. When it comes to our security, we really don’t need anybody’s permission.” More than ever, the Americans seem determined to go to war no matter how much international opposition they face.

Iraqi Opposition Differs With US

It cannot be said that the four-day meeting of the Iraqi opposition in Salahuddin in northern Iraq that ended on 1 March was a success from the American point of view, since the Americans and Iraqis conspicuously failed to see eye to eye on at least two major issues. On 28 February the opposition groups announced the appointment of a six-member council to serve as an “interim leadership” in a post-Saddam Iraq comprising Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Hakim of the Shi'a Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), Mas'ud Barzani of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), Ahmad Chalabi of the Iraqi National Congress (INC), Ayad 'Allawi of the Iraqi National Accord (INA) and former foreign minister Adnan Pachachi (the only Sunni Arab member of the council.) However, Mr Pachachi immediately announced that he had already “rejected the offers that were made” to him to join the new body, while the Americans, who are now planning a period of temporary military rule in Iraq in the immediate aftermath of the war, ostentatiously failed to endorse the new body. According to White House spokesman Ari Fleischer on 28 February, “it is not the place of the US to choose Iraq’s next leader…the future of Iraq must be decided by people inside Iraq and outside Iraq, and the US has made no specific selections. It will not be our place to do so.” Over at the State Department spokesman Richard Boucher confirmed that “our position has been and remains that we do not support the creation of a provisional government or a government-in-exile at this time.” He added: “We believe that trying to create a government prior to the liberation of the country would, in effect, disenfranchise the vast majority of Iraqis who continue to live inside Iraq and under the brutal dictatorship of Saddam Husain. Their voices need to be heard as well.” But if the Americans did not think much of the opposition’s attempt to preempt the question of who or what is to replace the present regime in Baghdad, the opposition had an equally low opinion of the Americans’ plans. According to one SCIRI official on 1 March, US special envoy Zalmay Khalilzad “mentioned that a military governor will rule Iraq because we were not ready. So we told him that if America thinks it was treated badly in Somalia, how does it think it will be treated in Iraq? After all these years of suffering, why should we live under foreign occupation?”

A second bone of contention between the Americans and Iraqis was the US plan for Turkish forces to enter northern Iraq alongside US forces. Mr Khalilzad tried to allay Iraqi suspicions by declaring that “any Turkish involvement in the coalition would be like other members of the coalition, that its forces have to be fully coordinated with the coalition if they come into Iraq,” and that any forces entering Iraq with the coalition would have to leave when the coalition withdrew. But he also said that “we look forward to Turkey’s membership and joining of this coalition,” a point of view emphatically not shared by the Iraqis, particularly Kurdish ones. According to KDP member Sami 'Abd al-Rahman on 28 February, “to allow Turkish forces into Iraqi Kurdistan despite the total objection of our people is a betrayal. It is not fair for your own benefit you sacrifice our people. In my lifetime, twice the US government has betrayed us. Now, if this goes ahead, it will be a third betrayal in one generation. Our people are going to resist it with all the means that are at their disposal.” His views were echoed by KDP leader Mas'ud Barzani on 1 March when he said that “even if Turkish troops are under US command, this is not acceptable to us. The Americans are perfectly aware of our position…and the Kurdish people will rise to the challenge of any conspiracy.” Meanwhile the Turks, as ever, were keeping a wary eye on the situation in north Iraq and warning both the Kurds and the Americans not to ignore their interests. “There are worrying and regrettable developments in northern Iraq,” Mr Erdogan said on 4 March. “Some circles are taking courage from the present situation and playing a dangerous game that will irritate some sensitivities. Nobody should abuse Turkey’s good will, be carried away by false courage, test Turkey’s sensitivities…I reiterate that the US administration must follow a policy which takes into consideration Turkey’s regional sensitivities. The US should have a political attitude to prevent entities from emerging on their own and upsetting Turkey.”

Charles Snow