The Political Scene

The US has now tabled a draft resolution in the Security Council authorizing the use of force against Iraq, but the council remains as divided as ever. Turkey is still not wholly on board the American bandwagon, but the two sides have agreed that Turkish troops will go into Iraq alongside US forces, a move which the Iraqi opposition views with the deepest suspicion. President Bush believes that regime change in Iraq will have a positive effect on the regional peace process, but the guidelines for Israel’s new coalition government suggest otherwise.

US Submits Draft Resolution: France Counters With Memorandum

The US and UK on 24 February tabled a draft Security Council resolution on Iraq in which the council, “noting that Iraq has submitted a declaration pursuant to its resolution 1441 containing false statements and omissions and has failed to comply with and cooperate fully in the implementation of that resolution” and acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, “decides that Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity afforded it in Resolution 1441.” This clear authorization for the use of force was immediately countered by a memorandum submitted to the Council by France, with the backing of Germany and Russia, arguing the case for the peaceful disarmament of Iraq. “Full and effective disarmament in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions remains the imperative objective of the international community,” this says. “Our priority should be to achieve this peacefully through the inspection regime. The military option should only be a last resort. So far, the conditions for using force against Iraq are not fulfilled.” The memorandum goes on to say that “the Security Council must step up its efforts to give a real chance to the peaceful settlement of the crisis” and that “the verifiable disarmament of Iraq” can be achieved through “a clear programs of action for the inspections,” reinforced inspections and “timelines for inspections and assessment.”

The stage was thus set for a bitter and probably lengthy battle for the hearts, minds and votes of the six uncommitted council members – Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Guinea, Mexico and Pakistan. (The US, UK, Spain and Bulgaria are in the pro-war camp, while Russia, China, France, Germany and Syria favor reinforced inspections). The US will need to persuade five of these countries to follow its lead if it is to win the vote (assuming none of the permanent members decides to exercise its veto). However, Chile’s UN ambassador, Gabriel Veldes, indicated on 27 February that at least some members of the group are unwilling to be railroaded into voting before the permanent five have managed to resolve their differences, saying that “as long as we cannot find common ground that bridges the different positions, we will not support rushing towards a resolution or an agreement in one way or another.” Moreover the Russian Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov, on 28 February moved a step closer to suggesting that Russia might use its veto when he said that “Russia has veto power. If needed, and under the conditions of maintaining international stability, Russia will use its veto,” adding that “if it is a question of using force to resolve the Iraqi issue, under these circumstances there would be serious effects not only regionally but globally.” At the end of the week, therefore, it was far from clear whether the Americans would get their way at the UN before embarking on a war that looks virtually inevitable with or without the backing of the Security Council.

Turks Hold Out

One sign of how unpopular the US position on Iraq is internationally is that one of Washington’s staunchest allies, Turkey, has still not agreed to allow the Americans to use its territory and facilities despite another week of negotiations. It is true that the Turkish government finally submitted a motion to parliament on 25 February which approves “the temporary deployment in Turkey…of a maximum of 62,000 military personnel and air elements of no more than 225 planes and 65 helicopters for a period of six months.” (It is also true that Turkish Economy Minister Ali Babacan indicated on 26 February that as part of the package the Americans had offered Turkey a grant of $6bn, which works out at around $97,000 a head.) However, the motion faced considerable opposition, not least from deputy Prime Minister Ertugrul Yalcinbayir, who said on 25 February he would vote against it since “in my opinion there is no legitimate ground (for war).” (Mr Yalcinbayir was quoted as saying on 27 February that he has considered resigning, but does not want to “create chaos.”) Moreover Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul announced on 27 February that while agreement had been reached on the military part of the deal – under which Turkish forces would move into northern Iraq with the Americans – differences on economic and political issues remained to be resolved. At MEES press time on 28 February, Turkish officials were saying that the motion could – but not would – be put to a vote on 1 March. However, despite the delays, it still seemed likely that in the end the Turks would give the Americans the green light, if only because not to do so would be a devastating blow for the American campaign against Iraq – and for the longstanding alliance between Washington and Ankara.

Iraqi Opposition Unites – Against Turkey

As might be expected, at their two-day meeting in Salahaddin in northern Iraq which began on 26 February the various Iraqi opposition groups (and they are indeed various) tended to see things from their own particular point of view. Thus for Iraqi National Congress leader Ahmad Chalabi, who opposes US plans to install a temporary military government in Baghdad, “we seek in this conference to declare our support for Iraqi sovereignty…we want Iraqi sovereignty over Iraqi soil, and in the absence of this there will be chaos.” Similarly the representative of the Iranian-backed Shi’ite Supreme Assembly for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI), ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Hakim, warned that “one of the biggest dangers of this war is foreign domination.” (However it must be said that SAIRI’s chronic mistrust of the US is probably tempered by the realization that the Americans are Iraq’s best, if not only, hope of getting rid of Saddam Husain.) Unsurprisingly, Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) leader Mas’ud Barzani put the emphasis on federalism when he called for “unifying the work of the Iraqi opposition, with the help and support of the international community, for a united, democratic and federal Iraq.”

But there was one issue on which all the Iraqi opposition groups could agree – that they do not want Turkish troops in northern Iraq. According to the spokesman for the opposition, KDP official Hoshyar Zebari, on 27 February, “the Iraqi opposition is united in opposing any intervention. As opposed to Kurds versus Turks, this is the unanimous view of all the opposition. This could have serious consequences for the campaign in Iraq. It would be a destabilizing factor. There would be problems, there would be clashes.” Mr Zebari added that “we have decided to send a high-level delegation for multilateral talks with the US and Turkey. We hope there will be a positive response to this.” That seems unlikely, given Turkey’s mistrust of Kurdish separatism and Washington’s need for Turkish acquiescence in the campaign against Iraq. In Ankara, a Foreign Ministry spokesman sought to play down the issue on 25 February when he said “it would be very misleading and unjustified to interpret any military measures Turkey might take to ensure its own security and to provide humanitarian aid to a possible wave of refugees as having a design or intentions over Iraq.” However, presidential spokesman Tacan Ildem sounded a steelier note on 27 February, saying that “we see northern Iraq as an issue directly related to Turkey’s national interests and security. We hope that groups in northern Iraq do not resort to provocative statements… It is more appropriate for all to see Turkey as a party to regional cooperation, rather than a hostile party.” As for the Americans, US special envoy Zalmay Khalilzad, caught squarely in the cross fire at the Salahaddin meeting, probably did more to reinforce than allay Kurdish suspicions with a statement on 27 February saying that “we are confident that any coalition operations undertaken will be fully coordinated, that there is no intention by Turkey to act outside of this framework in northern Iraq, and that there will be full withdrawal by all coalition forces when the job is done.”

Bush Links Regime Change To Peace Process

With all attention focused on the looming confrontation with Iraq, the regional peace process is to all appearances not just on the back burner but off the stove altogether, although Mr Bush has now indicated that it is likely to be back on the agenda once the question of Iraq is resolved one way or another. Indeed, he apparently believes that regime change in Iraq will improve the prospects for peace. “Success in Iraq could also begin a new stage for Middle Eastern peace, and set in motion progress towards a truly democratic Palestinian state,” he told the American Enterprise Institute on 26 February. “The passing of Saddam Husain’s regime will deprive terrorist networks of a wealthy patron that pays for terrorist training and offers rewards to the families of suicide bombers. And other regimes will be given a clear warning that support for terror will not be tolerated. Without this outside support for terrorism, Palestinians who are working for reform and long for democracy will be in a better position to choose new leaders. True leaders who strive for peace.” Israel, for its part, “as the terror threat is removed and security improves, will be expected to support the creation of a viable Palestinian state and to work as quickly as possible toward a final status agreement. As progress is made toward peace, settlement activity in the occupied territories must end.” Mr Bush also appeared to reaffirm the American commitment to the road map to a settlement being drawn up by the Quartet (the US, EU, UN and Russia), although without mentioning the Quartet or its members by name. “The US and other nations are working on a road map for peace,” he said. “We are setting out the necessary conditions for progress toward the goal of two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security. It is the commitment of our government – and my personal commitment – to implement the road map and reach that goal.”

Sharon Forms A Government

To those who are not immersed in the hothouse atmosphere of Washington think tanks, the link between regime change in Iraq and the prospects for regional peace appears more than a little tenuous. Indeed, there are those who might suggest that regime change in Israel would do far more to further the peace process, particularly after the 26 February announcement that Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has put together a coalition government that relies for its majority on two parties of the extreme right. The coalition groups Mr Sharon’s right-wing Likud party (with 40 seats in the 120-seat Knesset) and the secular center party Shinui (15 seats) with the pro-settlement National Religious Party (6 seats) and the far right secular National Union (7 seats). And that is not good news for the peace process, since the coalition’s guidelines on negotiations and a Palestinian state – which both the NRP and NU oppose – refer to a speech given by Mr Sharon at the Herzliya Conference on 4 December 2002. This speech, little noticed (if at all) at the time, was described by one Likud official on 25 February as “an integral part of the government’s program” and now appears to be the official policy of the Israeli Government. (The full text is to be found on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website www.israel-mfa.gov.il). In it Mr Sharon said (inter alia):

“On June 24 of this year President Bush presented his plan for a true solution to our conflict with the Palestinians. The peace plan outlined in the president’s speech is a reasonable, pragmatic and practicable one, which offers a real opportunity to achieve an agreement. We have accepted in principle the president’s plan and the sequence presented therein.”
“After concerted efforts, the US administration has understood and agreed that the only way to achieve a true peace agreement with the Palestinians is progress in phases, with the first phase being the complete cessation of terror.”
“The American plan defines the parties’ progress according to phases. The transition from one phase to the next will not be on the basis of a predetermined schedule – which would have resulted in a build-up of heavy pressure on Israel towards the end of one phase and approaching the next phase. Rather, progress is determined on the basis of performance – only once a specific phase has been implemented will progress into the next phase be possible.”
“The achievement of true coexistence must be carried out, first and foremost, by the replacement of the Palestinian leadership…The reconstruction of a Palestinian government should commence with governmental reforms which will ultimately lead to the establishment of a new, honest and peace seeking administration, the removal of ‘Arafat from his command of power and sources of financing and from the decision making process.”
“The elections in the Palestinian Authority should be held only at the conclusion of the reform process and after proper governmental regulations have been internalized.”
“Parallel with, and perhaps even prior to the governmental reforms, a security reform will be carried out consisting of three principal parts:

“1. Dismantling of all existing security (/terrorist) bodies…

“2. A Minister of the Interior will be appointed and will be responsible for collecting illegal weapons and

transferring them to a third party…

“3. In addition, cooperation on security issues between the PA and Israel will be renewed immediately.”

“Peace and coexistence cannot be achieved without reform in the fields of education, media and information; the virulent incitement mechanism instigated by the PA against Israel must be stopped immediately.”
“The two sides will advance to the next phase of President Bush’s sequence when a new different, responsible and non-corrupt Palestinian leadership emerges. Terror will cease…civil and economic cooperation will be established. Incitement will be stopped and education towards peace will be fostered. At the same time, Israel will act to lift military pressure, create territorial continuity between Palestinian population centers, and ease daily life for the Palestinian population.”
“The second phase of President Bush’s sequence proposes the establishment of a Palestinian state with borders yet to be finalized and which will overlap with territories A and B, except for essential security zones. This Palestinian state will be completely demilitarized. It will be allowed to maintain lightly armed police and interior forces to ensure civil order. Israel will continue to control all entries and exits to the Palestinian state, will command its airspace, and will not allow it to form alliances with Israel’s enemies.”
“In the final phase of President Bush’s sequence, negotiations will be opened to determine the final status of the Palestinian state and fix its permanent borders. As I emphasized, no progress will be made from one phase to the next until such time as quiet has been restored, Palestinian rule has undergone fundamental changes and coexistence is ensured.”

There are a number of things that could be said about this document. One is that although Mr Sharon presents his scenario as variously “the American plan” and “President Bush’s sequence,” in reality he appears to have filled in the substantial blank spaces in Mr Bush’s 24 June “vision” of a settlement with some distinctly Israeli ideas, and right-wing Israeli ideas at that. (It would be interesting to know how far the Americans were consulted about Mr Sharon’s interpretation of US policy and what they intend to do about it if they were not.) Another is that Mr Sharon’s travel plans on the way to peace clearly do not follow the road map of the Quartet, which supposedly includes a timetable for reaching Palestinian statehood. And lastly, while Mr Sharon is studiously vague as to the final status and permanent borders of the Palestinian state, the offer of an interim state of indefinite duration in part of the West Bank whose borders and airspace are controlled by Israel is not one that is likely to be acceptable even to the “reformed” Palestinian leadership Mr Sharon is seeking.

Charles Snow