The Political Scene

UNMOVIC head Hans Blix’s latest report to the Security Council has changed no-one’s mind on Iraq, and the Americans are now at work on a second resolution which they say will be submitted to the council in the near future. NATO has papered over its differences about preparing to defend Turkey, but Turkey itself is now dragging its feet about allowing US forces in. At the EU summit in Brussels, French President Jacques Chirac launched an extraordinary attack on pro-American EU candidate members.

Blix Report: More Of The Same

Chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix’s 14 February report on Iraq to the Security Council had much the same effect as his previous report on 27 January, in that it contained something for everyone and therefore changed no-one’s mind. For example, Mr Blix said that “inspections are effectively helping to bridge the gap in knowledge that arose due to the absence of inspections between December 1998 and November 2002,” which pleased the doves who want to give the inspectors more time. But he also noted that “another matter – and one of great significance – is that many proscribed weapons and items are not accounted for,” which provided ammunition for the hawks who insist that the Iraqis are hoodwinking the inspectors. Thus French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin, speaking after Mr Blix, told the Security Council that the use of force was not yet justified and inspections are still “the most sure and rapid” way to disarm Iraq (and was applauded for doing so). But for US Secretary of State Colin Powell, “we now are in a situation where Iraq’s continued non-compliance and failure to cooperate – it seems to me, in the clearest terms – requires this council to begin to think through the consequences of walking away from this problem or the reality that we have to face this problem…So many of you would rather not have to face this issue, but it is an issue that must be faced.”

And will be soon, if the Americans have anything to do with it, since White House spokesman Ari Fleischer indicated on 18 February that the US would submit a new resolution to the Security Council in the near future. “The administration is continuing to work with our allies about the exact language and drafting of it. And as I indicated, it could be this week, I could be next. It’s going to be a relatively simple resolution, not very lengthy. The message of it is that 1441 shall be enforced.” At best, though, it looks as if any resolution authorizing the use of force at this stage faces a doubtful future. French President Jacques Chirac warned on 17 February that “it is not necessary today to have a second resolution, which France can only oppose.” And Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov reiterated on 20 February that “we are not against a second resolution in principle, but we must see what purpose it would serve…If the resolution aims to reinforce the mandate of the inspectors, we will be ready to look at it. If it is designed to allow the use of force, we believe it would be detrimental.”

NATO Compromises: Now Turkey Drags Its Feet

NATO finally managed to patch up the divisions in its ranks caused by the 10 February Franco-German-Belgian veto of an American proposal for contingency planning for the defense of Turkey on 16 February, when its Defense Planning Committee – in which France does not participate – reached an agreement under which NATO will provide AWACS aircraft to Turkey and support the possible deployment there of missile defenses and chemical and biological defense capabilities. However, there was a price to be paid for this apparent compromise by France and its allies, who saw the original American proposal as an attempt to preempt the UN, in the form of a proviso in the agreement recalling the provisions of NATO’s founding treaty, “in particular the undertaking of allies in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN.” Moreover the three countries immediately issued a statement declaring that “the decision by NATO does not in any way prejudge the ongoing efforts by Belgium, France and Germany to continue to work within the framework of UNSCR 1441.”

Such moves suggested that NATO had papered over its differences rather than resolved them, but that did not prevent US NATO ambassador Nicholas Burns from claiming on 19 February that “alliance solidarity has prevailed.” No sooner had he done so, however, than Turkey dug in its heels in response to American pressure on Ankara to authorize the deployment of US forces on Turkish soil, with the announcement by Prime Minister Abdullah Gul on 17 February that a parliamentary vote on the question scheduled for 18 February had been postponed, since without an agreement with the US on “political, economic and military questions” parliament would not endorse such a motion. The next day, the leader of the ruling AKP party, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, warned that the Americans should not interpret the decision earlier this month to allow the US personnel to refurbish military facilities in Turkey to mean “that Turkey has embarked on an irreversible road,” adding that “our counterparts should fulfill our demands. If we are to act together, if our support is meaningful and necessary to the US, then the US should take into account our sensitivities and consider with good will our demands. Otherwise the partnership and the friendship will turn into constant sacrifices made by one of the sides – and this is unacceptable.”

By now the Americans were beginning to show signs of impatience, with Mr Ari Fleischer saying on 18 February that “we continue to work with Turkey as a friend, but it’s decision time. It’s a matter that I think people can anticipate will be settled one way or another rather soon.” By the next day the note of impatience in American statements had become unmistakable (perhaps because of the reported presence of several American troop carriers waiting off the Turkish coast to land their cargoes). According to State Department spokesman Richard Boucher, Mr Powell “stressed the importance of reaching a decision very soon on the remaining issues” in a 19 February phone call to Turkish Prime Minister Abdullah Gul. On the same day Mr Fleischer referred indirectly to the delicate matter of money when he said that “as a long-standing strategic partner of the US, there are issues that are under consideration in terms of the impact a war might bring to Turkey, being a neighbor of Iraq,” and also warned that “Turkey’s support would be desirable but not essential in a US military operation against Iraq…the military of the US is sufficiently flexible for whatever decision is made.” The next day Turkish Economy Minister Ali Babacan was considerably more blunt about the financial element of the US package, saying that “we have found the figures insufficient and we are not looking favorably at the offer.” Also on 20 February an attempt by Mr Powell to pressure the Turks – “I expect to hear back from them before the day is out” – backfired when Foreign Minister Yasar Yakis reacted by saying that “there is no reply to go today. We are trying to stand firm against the US.” Over at the White House, Mr Fleischer warned that “there is not a lot of time that can pass. This is not a bluff…We have to deal with realities, and we will. If basing is not allowed in Turkey, we have no choice, we will pursue other options.”

With the Turkish government expected to make a statement on the basing of US troops more or less as MEES went to press on 21 February, the question of whether or not the US would be able to launch a land attack on Iraq through Turkey remained unresolved. On balance, though, it was for once difficult not to agree with US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who said on 19 February that “I suspect that in one way or another – a variety of ways probably – they’ll end up cooperating in the event that force has to be used in Iraq.” After all, as Mr Erdogan remarked on 4 February “if one is left out of the equation at the start of the operation, it may not be possible to be in a position to control developments at the end of the operation” – and since Turkey has vital interests at stake in this particular operation, the odds are that it will in the end seek to deal itself into the game, even if it means defying public opinion and compromising on financial demands.

EU Summit: Chirac Attacks Candidate Members

Like NATO, the EU also succeeded in papering over its differences on Iraq at the summit in Brussels of the current 15 members on 17 February, but if anything even less convincingly. The meeting did manage to produce a lowest-common-denominator statement which said, inter alia, that “we reiterate our full support for the ongoing work of the UN inspectors. They must be given the time and resources the UN Security Council believes they need,” but that “Iraq has a final opportunity to resolve the crisis peacefully. The Iraqi regime alone will be responsible for the consequences if it continues to flout the will of the international community and does not take this last chance.” However, the ink was barely dry on this document before French President Jacques Chirac launched an extraordinary and vitriolic attack on the east European candidate members of the EU who have issued pro-American statements in the last month (such as Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania and the Czech Republic), saying that “they should have kept quiet. They are on the one hand not very well brought up and a bit unaware of the dangers that a too-rapid alignment with the American position could bring with it…I find that Romania and Bulgaria were particularly flighty to launch out on this campaign while their position is still very delicate with regard to the EU. If they really want to diminish their chances to join the EU, then they couldn’t find a better way of doing it.” Not unnaturally, these remarks were seen by the countries concerned – who protested vigorously – as an attempt to assert the primacy of the Franco-German position within the EU and to impose it on the 13 candidate members. But the French stuck to their guns, with Defense Minister Michele Alliot-Marie saying on 18 February that “the EU has gone through a mini-crisis, difficulties. We would have expected that the countries that want to join us strike up a cautious position…in the interest of these countries themselves, I say take care that there will not be a reaction from citizens, saying these countries do not want peace inside the European family.” So while the Brussels summit may have produced a pro forma show of unity from the existing EU membership, it appears only to have widened the gap between the “old” and “new” Europe – a prospect that is hardly likely to displease the neo-conservative hawks in Washington.

Charles Snow