Middle East Economic Survey
VOL. XLVII
No 26
Arab Press Review
Turkey’s Political Model
(MEES Translation)
The following is extracted from an article entitled “The New Turkey And The Arab Political System” by a Turkish affairs specialist in Lebanon, Jihad al-Zain, that was published in the Beirut daily al-Nahar on 20 June.
The new Secretary-General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Dr Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, belongs to what used to be known in Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s as the Islamic nationalists – that group of nationalist Turks with (non-radical) Islamic inclinations, known for their association with the general structure of the Turkish state. Or to put the matter in more political terms, Dr Ekmeleddin is an Islamic personality who is directly associated with the Kemalist establishment.
The choice of the new secretary-general has symbolic significance, internally and externally – inside Turkey and in the region round about. As for the case inside Turkey, there is an ongoing experiment that is both important and successful. It can be described as a period of reconciliation between the “state” and “society”. This is reflected in the presence of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who was chosen by “society” at the ballot box, with the understanding before and during the elections of the Turkish military establishment – representing the “state”, despite the inevitable differences between them that emerge from time to time.
When the generation that was brought to maturity through the experiments involving the Islamists and the military establishment was reconciled sufficiently to run Turkey, it was perhaps only logical that figures such as Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu should appear, representing the natural reconciliation between Islam and nationalism. For Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu and others like him had been encouraging reconciliation through experiments at the personal level, rather than the narrow political one, for two decades, and through reforming the vision of the Turkish state by means of their view of society. And I repeat: they were always Muslims, but never radicals.
Through these internal changes in Turkey Dr Ekmeleddin was selected as the new OIC secretary-general. The government (and the Turkish state) appointed him to the position, despite the opposition of some Kemalists and traditionalists. As for those outside Turkey who agreed with the choice… there are external reasons. For Turkey once again occupies an important position on a number of levels.
Firstly, Turkey has become once more an exporter of ideas in the region (while Iranian exports have declined to such an extent that Iran, as a model, has again become an importer). For, as Arab and Islamic affairs in the region have progressed, the beginnings of a Turkish model have appeared – one rooted in democracy, with Islam acting as a liberal political force. However, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish prime minister, does not like to call the AKP a party of Muslim Democrats, along the lines of the Christian Democrats in Europe. Instead, he prefers to call the movement one of Conservatives. In reality, though, what is happening is the birth of a Muslim Democrat party, with a modern meaning (its historical roots in the Arab world were in Egypt and Syria in the first half of the 20th century; its development was broken off by the pressure brought to bear by the Arab-Israeli conflict that put the military, with leftist and totalitarian ideologies, into power).
As for the second level, this is the most important one at the present time inside the OIC, for it represents the practical and developing consciousness of the states of the region. In particular, the major Arab states need Turkey – after 11 September and even more so after the fall of Saddam Husain. The need is not just for stability, but also to avoid collapse. For the Arab political system has gone beyond the point where it can be called merely the victim of tragedy, for it was born as such a victim by virtue of the Arab-Israeli conflict. And it has gone on seeing itself as a victim, facing a severe crisis in the form of the Palestinian issue and the crises around it. What is new, especially after the earthquake in Iraq, is that the whole system faces collapse – regimes and even states. In this atmosphere, the whole Arab political system, and especially that governing the major states, is looking to Turkey as an element of harmony (I would almost say a balancing factor) in relations in the region at this difficult time. Despite the large weight of ideological, political, and even cultural reservations about Turkey that existed until recently in Arab official circles and among the political elite, over the past two years it has become clear that Turkish policy is taking a more honorable view of the region. Take the situation in Iraq, beginning with the opposition to the US attack; or, what is clearer still, Turkey’s position on Israeli policies towards the Palestinian people. This is Turkey’s exterior face because of the particular party in power. But the party deals with the two issues (Iraq and Palestine) as ones that concern the whole state, and not just the government – that is to say it is not just a political line, despite the importance of the individuals leading the Turkish government at present.
So Turkey is embarking on a completely different path in its dealings with the Arab world, and in particular the Arab Mashriq. For one thing, it urgently wants the Arab status quo to continue, and is putting forward an achievable model for Arab change. It needs Arab conservatives, of the right and left; Arabs advocating change, Islamic liberals, leftist liberals or just liberals – behaving without the fundamentalism or far-left leanings of the past.
This new Turkish pattern, opened the door to the choice of a Turk as OIC secretary-general, even though he faced opposition from some key Arab states (Saudi Arabia and Egypt, so it is said). The new OIC secretary-general comes from the most powerful of the states in the international and regional organization. For it is least sensitive to internal political crises and threats from the outside. This makes its stand out from all the other member states, especially the Arab ones, which despite the major differences among them, are all obsessed with the danger of an unforeseen collapse. Even Iran should be set apart from the Arab states and seen in the same category as Turkey. Both states are deeply stable. Even so, Iran differs from Turkey in that the type of political system – not the “state”, if one can use that expression – there is more sensitive to worries about its fate. As for the situation in the Arab world, the worries of the state and the political system are interlocked, and sometimes it is hard to separate one from the other. For the Arab Mashriq states live in anxiety about the threat to their very existence, as much as to the regimes themselves.