Middle East Economic Survey

VOL. L

No 34

20-August-2007

Iraq Scenarios Post-2010

The following are extracts from the conclusions of the Center for Global Affairs (CGA) Iraq scenarios workshop, conducted on 30 March 2007. The workshop was assembled and led by Prof Michael Oppenheimer, CGA, New York University (NYU). Participants included: Richard Bulliet (prof of history, Columbia University); Steven Cook (Douglas Dillon Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations); Paul Cruickshank (fellow, NYU School of Law); Gregory Gause (associate prof of political science, University of Vermont); Terree Haidet (Federal Executive Fellow, The Brookings Institution); Toby Jones (Mellon Postdoctoral Fellow, Swathmore College); Gideon Rose (managing editor, Foreign Affairs); Gary Sick (senior research scholar, Middle East Institute); and Steven Simon (senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies, Council On Foreign Relations). The extracts are published with the authorization of Prof Oppenheimer.

The process was designed as a free-flowing discussion on plausible futures for the Middle East, post-US occupation of Iraq. It was not a formal simulation with assigned roles and a scripted dialogue, but a facilitated conversation among Middle East and US foreign policy experts trying to imagine the region without a large US footprint in Iraq. In order to avoid a focus on the immediate issues of the surge and its short-term effects, the reversal of de-Ba΄thification, oil revenue sharing, etc, we began with the period of greatly diminished American military presence, which we assumed to be 2010, and carried the scenarios through 2015. This allowed for some residual US deployments in Iraq, and of course a significant presence in the region. By leaping over immediate controversies, we hoped to better imagine the region as it reacts to local forces and interests, while still absorbing the after effects of the American invasion.

Scenario 1:  National Unity Dictatorship

Summary

Confronted with the harsh realities of continuing sectarian rivalry and religious violence in Iraq, and with the American military presence dwindling, attention of local and regional players turns towards recreating an acceptable version of Husain’s rule. Minds concentrate on the imperative of keeping the country’s nascent civil war from expanding into regional conflict and in finding, or facilitating the emergence of, strong and unifying central leadership. This goal is shared, more or less, by the United States, which has long given up on democracy building in Iraq.

A “National Unity Dictator” (NUD) is willing and able to suspend the constitution in order to address the lack of law and order that has led many Iraqis to flee the country or to throw their support behind insurgent groups and sectarian militias. Such a NUD would tap into dormant strains of Iraqi nationalism by resisting all elements compromising Iraqi sovereignty, including Sunni insurgents, al-Qa΄ida in Iraq (AQI), the American presence, Iranian supported militias and Kurdish separatists.

The NUD is not necessarily a secular leader and is likely to be situated between all of the ethnic and religious factions that currently divide Iraq. This leader is an Iraqi nationalist, not an Arab nationalist, and emerges after a substantial withdrawal of US troops from Iraq, sometime between 2010-12. By that point the failure of the Islamists and successive weak administrations in Baghdad will have persuaded large numbers of Iraqis to trade the liberal freedoms they have enjoyed on paper since the fall of Saddam for freedom from fear.

The NUD represents the first leader in post-Saddam Iraq who combines the room to maneuver in forcefully dealing with violent insurgents with an ability to operate among Iraq’s internecine ethnic and religious divisions. A leader who is properly situated between these groups, most likely a Shi'a with good relations across communities, could exploit tensions between tribal leaders and foreign jihadis and attempt to unite the country under the task of flushing out al-Qa΄ida-like terrorists and restoring stability.

Any US attempt to anoint a friendly leader with this role is likely to backfire. Indeed, his emergence will probably come as a surprise. In civil wars, it is often military – not political – leaders who are able to consolidate power due to their prowess in battle. That inherently unpredictable process as well as the necessity that the NUD not be seen as doing the bidding of the US means that the United States may have to wait for him to emerge independently, then court his support.

The NUD is valuable to the United States only to the extent that he is able to hold the nation together and keep the chaos currently reigning in Iraq from spilling out into a regional conflagration. A withdrawal of US troops is necessary for the emergence of a NUD, but not sufficient. Another important component of this scenario is the Iraqi army, which must be transformed into a force that is representative of the entire country and strong enough to engineer the most likely path for a NUD to assume power: a coup. Providing an environment in which a NUD can emerge will require the United States to maintain a delicate balance both within Iraq and among the other states in the region.

Conclusion

A policy of supporting the emergence of a NUD in Iraq reflects the re-emergence of realist thinking on the part of the United States after an ambitious but failed project to bring democracy to Iraq. The NUD scenario represents a rediscovery of the virtues of stability in the Middle East, a refocusing of American power on the fight against al-Qa'ida, and a prolongation – at least – of the timeline for democracy building.

Of the three scenarios developed by the CGA group, this is the only one from which a stable Iraq emerges. That stability is by no means guaranteed in the long-term. The relationship with the NUD could deteriorate over time, as it did with Saddam, or he could lose his grip on power.

The larger problem of increased Salafism and the impact the Iraq war has already had on the global terror threat will remain despite the emergence of the NUD, and institution-building and working towards a more participatory political system in Iraq, and the wider Middle East, should remain the long-term goal, with the NUD thought of as a stop-gap measure to help that process take place organically.

Scenario 2:  Contained Mess

Summary

The instability in Iraq continues, with the growing confrontation between Sunni and Shi΄a-governed states fought mostly within Iraq’s borders. As Iraq disintegrates into a brutal all-out civil war, neighboring countries, realizing the potential for contagion, go to great lengths to keep the chaos contained within Iraq. Proxy war is the result, along the lines of the Spanish Civil War. However, the chaos in Iraq affords al-Qa΄ida greater opportunities in the region and confronting radicalization will be a constant challenge for Arab governments.

In this scenario, all players other than Turkey are prepared to keep the Iraqi caldron boiling. However, none want it to overflow. Thus, while the insurgency is fed from the outside, there is an unspoken agreement that the conflict will not be allowed to expand beyond Iraq’s borders. Such a delicate balance could be tipped if one of the parties within Iraq gains the upper hand. In the interest of keeping the conflict contained, however, there is motivation to prevent this.

Refugee flows, sectarian violence, and ethnic cleansing keep neighboring states involved in the conflict. Since Iran and Turkey are the only real military powers in the region, most Arab neighbors participate through local proxies.

Everyone in the region knows how to muddle through. They’ve been doing it for the past 50 years, and continue to do so. While Iraq burns, states keep an eye on each other to make sure the status quo ante is not disturbed.

Conclusion

This scenario is difficult to sustain over time and could potentially lead into one of the others. The challenges are significant: keeping Turkey from retaliating in force against the PKK; keeping Sunni jihadis from taking their fight outside the confines of Iraq; keeping the Sunni and Shi΄a populations from going at each other in neighboring countries while sectarian violence rages in Iraq; and holding the containment coalition together.

Resisting the outflow of jihadist activists and ideas is the most serious problem, even if overt war is contained inside Iraq. Iraq-hardened jihadists will fan out across the region and attempt to undo the stabilizing efforts of regional state actors by radicalizing their populations. They will seek to violently bring down any or all of the Arab regimes as they spread their revolution, and they will enjoy a degree of support among many of the locals. The key to Scenario Two is twofold: regional powers avoid direct state-to-state conflict while repressing internal jihadi activities as well.

Thus, the path towards Scenario One or Scenario Three unfolds. Should the destabilizing forces emanating from Iraq succeed, region-wide chaos ensues, engulfing the whole Middle East. Alternatively, fearing just such an escalation, all the major players in the region might allow, or even encourage, the emergence of a National Unity Dictator (NUD). If such a figure emerged, it is unlikely that anyone in the region will resist, even if the NUD proves to be less impartial than originally desired. However, given the proven ability of Arab regimes to muddle through under the most trying circumstances, an extended Scenario Two status quo could develop.

Scenario 3:  Contagion

Summary

Iraq has descended into outright civil war. Instability spreads throughout the Middle East. The regional players, competing and insecure, fail to cooperate on matters of defense and counter-terrorism and prove unable to contain the fighting within Iraq. While US pressure and the limited military capacity of local actors have succeeded in preventing all-out regional conflict between Sunni and Shi'a-led states, the proxy war fought on Iraqi territory (Scenario 2) spreads to adjoining states through refugee flows, growing radicalization of Arab populations, escalating non-state terrorism, and the deliberate efforts of regional rivals to destabilize each others’ governments.

Existing regimes in the region cling to power, but with insufficient domestic political support or acquiescence to create coalitions and pursue effective balance of power strategies necessary to contain the Iraq civil war. Because their appetite for direct state-to-state conflict is limited, many regimes use sub-state actors to strike at their enemies. Regional rivalries flare up as various players vie for influence and control. Radicalization of Arab populations increases as sectarian strife radiates from Iraq. In these circumstances, unforeseen events—such as an Iranian-style revolution in a major Arab country—could radically alter the political landscape and reorder foreign policy priorities in the region.

Events could easily globalize this regional conflagration. A serious disruption to the oil supply, as the result of an attack on an important oil installation in the Gulf, is a likelihood in this scenario. Such an attack could come in various guises. Terrorists might target the energy infrastructure, with the US retaliating against Iran as a target. The US or Israel could also react to any number of Iranian provocations, including its imminent (by 2010) development of nuclear weapons, leading toward a major war.

Conclusion

This scenario is not in the long-term interests of any state actor—regional or global—and this fact argues for the higher probability of a stabilizing Iraqi dictator or sufficient regional collaboration to contain the conflict. The more this scenario is accepted as plausible, the greater the efforts of states to prevent it.

What keeps it in play, however, are several powerful forces. Terrorist groups are thriving in Iraq, have regional ambitions, and view chaos as an ally. The Sunni-Shi΄a divide deepens in Iraq and is spreading regionally. Iran has a hegemonic past, similar hopes for its future, and ties to terror groups with strengthening positions in the region. Arab regimes are insecure, often unpopular, face radicalized populations, and are rife with inter-Arab rivalries that complicate balancing against jidhadist or Iranian threats. In 2010, American popularity among Arab publics is at an all-time low, its physical presence is diminished, and its credibility among the region’s states – both allies and rivals – is deeply wounded. Under these conditions, it would be imprudent to believe too confidently in the logic of “self-interest” in the Middle East.