VOL. XLV

No 6

11 February 2002 

SAUDI ARABIA 

SAMBA’s Chief Economist Looks At Saudi Government Finances 

Given the structural change in the national budget of Saudi Arabia whereby the percentage spent on current expenditures has risen to the detriment of capital expenditures, and cumulative deficits have grown as a result of successive annual deficits, “realistically, only the imposition of substantial new domestic taxation and high levels of private sector growth (a tough combination to achieve) will lessen significantly dependence on oil revenues.” So says the latest assessment of the domestic economy, The Saudi Economy In 2002, February 2002, published by Saudi American Bank’s (SAMBA’s) Chief Economist Brad Bourland. The report says privatizations may contribute to revenue sources but they are only “one-time injections” and not a sustainable non-oil revenues source. In addition, it notes that customs duties are “declining in line with tariff reductions and the government’s bid to join the WTO”.  

SAMBA says government debt (all of which is domestically owned and riyal denominated), now stands at SR630bn ($171bn) or 99% of 2001 GDP (see Table 1 below). Of this, 19% is owned by the domestic banks, 75% is held by the state pension funds and a small portion by companies and individuals given special bonds by the government to settle late payment obligations. The aggregate total rose by SR11.4bn ($3.04bn) in 2001 “suggesting that the commercial banks financed about half of the 2001 deficit”. SAMBA estimates that financing the 2002 projected deficit need not be problematic  “assuming that the commercial banks absorb less than half and the pension funds lend the rest” but notes that future financing of this sort may be threatened by the funding needs of private sector projects. Hence, SAMBA says it is “concerned about the magnitude of government debt, continued substantial budget deficits and declining discretionary spending in the budget”. All three factors lead to a growing allocation of government revenues to debt servicing, increased demands on the banks which squeezes sectoral liquidity, and the loss of flexibility “to add fiscal stimulus to the economy at times of broader economic weakness”.  

SAMBA notes that the Saudi Government is strengthened fiscally by its $48.67bn worth of foreign assets (now reported by SAMA on a monthly basis reflecting “improvement in transparency of fiscal data”) and the additional $33.9bn held by the government pension funds that are invested conservatively, yielding on average 6% per year. Collectively these allow for investment income of $1.5bn per year without drawing down on the principal, although SAMBA notes that in years of low oil income such as 1998 and 1999, a portion of the principal was drawn on to meet budgetary needs. Moreover, foreign assets of the government pension funds generally report steady growth and even though in 1999 there was a reported decline, probably due to a “a loan from one of the funds to the government to help with revenues for that year”, in general these assets create a varied source of liquidity for the government and offset any weaknesses in government finance. Asset strength also helps to maintain the fixed exchange rate of the riyal in place since 1986. However, despite this strength, SAMBA points out that it is concerned by the fact that the government enters each oil price downturn with a smaller cushion, noting that net foreign assets of SAMA fell from $56.9bn in1997 to $48.7bn in November 2001. 

Table 1

Key Economic Data And Forecasts

($Bn unless noted otherwise)

 

 

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001e

2002f

Nominal GDP (SRBn)

450.03

478.65

529.25

548.44

481.20

535.02

648.96

637.28

618.16

  $Bn Equivalent

120.01

127.64

141.13

146.25

128.32

142.67

173.06

169.94

164.84

  % Change

1.4

6.4

10.6

3.6

-12.3

11.2

21.3

-1.8

-3.0

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Real GDP (% Change)

0.10

0.00

1.40

1.90

1.60

0.40

4.50

1.50

-2.0

  Oil

0.20

0.27

2.10

1.40

2.10

-2.40

8.50

-3.60

-7.50

  Non-Oil Private Sector

0.70

0.30

1.10

3.60

1.20

2.00

2.50

4.50

4.00

  Government

0.00

-0.30

1.30

2.90

0.90

1.70

1.00

1.00

1.00

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Unemployment

na

na

na

na

na

na

na

na

na

  (% of Saudi Labor Force)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Population (Mn Persons)

18.20

18.80

19.35

20.00

20.67

21.33

22.01

22.71

23.42

  Saudi

13.14

13.60

14.08

14.57

15.08

15.66

16.20

16.75

17.32

  Non-Saudi

5.06

5.21

5.27

5.43

5.59

5.68

5.80

5.96

6.10

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GDP/Capita ($)

6,594

6,789

7,294

7,313

6,208

6,689

7,863

7,483

7,039

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Oil Price ($/B)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  West Texas Intermediate

17.25

18.30

21.57

21.00

14.00

20.50

30.00

24.30

21.00

  Saudi Average

14.50

15.65

19.00

18.25

11.50

17.45

27.00

21.80

18.00

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Current Account

-10.40

-5.30

0.70

0.30

-13.10

0.40

15.60

8.30

-7.90

  as % of GDP

-8.67

-4.15

0.50

0.21

-10.21

0.28

9.01

4.88

-4.79

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Government Budget Balance

-9.28

-7.31

-5.07

-4.21

-12.27

-9.07

6.06

-6.70

-12.00

  Revenues

34.40

39.07

47.76

54.80

38.13

39.20

68.82

61.30

41.80

  Expenditures

43.68

46.37

52.83

59.01

50.40

48.27

62.76

68.00

53.80

  Budget Balance as % of GDP

-7.7

-5.7

-3.6

-2.9

-9.6

-6.4

3.5

-3.9

-7.3

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Government Domestic Debt (SR Bn)

342

397

445

477

558

625

616

630

675

  as % of GDP

76

83

84

87

116

119

95

99

109

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Official Foreign Assets

68.51

67.94

78.04

85.98

78.34

69.35

73.45

82.57

78.50

  Central Bank

47.50

46.10

52.08

58.21

46.63

39.01

40.70

48.67

43.00

  Government Pension Funds

21.00

21.84

25.96

27.77

31.71

30.34

32.75

33.90

35.50

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Cost of Living (% Change)

0.60

4.80

1.30

0.00

-0.20

-1.20

-1.00

-0.80

-0.50

 

Source