VOL. XLV
No 20
20 May 2002
SUDAN
Sudan Rejects
Sharing Oil Revenue With SPLA
The
Sudanese Government has rejected a draft US proposal that it should share oil revenue with the rebel
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA).
“The petroleum is a national wealth owned by the Sudanese people and
cannot be the object of compromise,” First Vice President 'Ali Othman Taha said in response to US press reports that President
George W. Bush’s special envoy for Sudan, Sen John Danforth, had proposed in a draft report to the White House
that some form of oil revenue sharing should be part of a peaceful solution to
the civil war that has pitted the Khartoum government against southern
insurgents for the last 19 years. “No enduring settlement to Sudan’s war can be achieved unless the oil dimension is
effectively addressed,” Mr Danforth
wrote in his draft report (see excerpt below). “It should be possible to find a
monetary formula for sharing oil revenue between the central government and the
people of the south who could use it for the purpose of economic development.”
The proposal on oil revenue sharing is unprecedented at this level in the Middle East and could have implications for other civil/internal conflicts
in the region where on the one hand, ethnic groups are in opposition to central
government and on the other, oil export revenues are a main source of state
revenue.
Fighting
between government forces and rebels in and around the southern oil producing
regions forced Lundin Petroleum to suspend operations
on Block 5A in January (MEES, 28
January). In its latest interim financial statement, Lundin
stressed that it remained committed to its Sudanese exploration operations,
where it said “the potential for large oil discoveries is among the highest
anywhere.” Lundin has a 40.375% interest in Block 5A
and 24.5% interest in Block 5B and has booked net proven and probable oil
reserves of 60mn barrels on Block 5A. “The ongoing peace effort has made some
good progress recently and we are still aiming to re-start operations next dry
season, starting in December,” Lundin President and
chief executive officer Ian Lundin said in a
statement.
Meanwhile
Canada’s Talisman Energy, a 25% shareholder in the Greater Nile Petroleum
Operating Company (GNPOC), announced that 1Q production from its Muglad Basin operations has raised its equity production by
17% year-on-year to 58,608 b/d. Overall GNPOC production of Nile Blend crude
oil is now running at an average 240,000 b/d, rising to 250,000 b/d during the
second half of the year. However, Talisman continues to come under pressure
over its Sudanese operations, with Canadian church groups among those that have
recently demanded that the company withdraw from Sudan. Talisman executives have responded to this pressure in
recent months by letting it be known that the company would do so if offered
the right price. On 1 May, chief executive Jim Buckee
said the company was talking to some half-dozen interested parties, among them India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corp. He refused to put a value on
the stake, but said that it was worth in excess of industry valuations of
$650mn.
Sudanese
officials in 2001 set optimistic targets for oil production of 450,000 b/d by
2005, but MEES understands that
current unrest in and around producing areas, combined with a more realistic
timetable for development projects, means that GNPOC production from the Muglad Basin is likely to lift output there to a maximum of
300,000 b/d in the coming two years. There are currently six producing blocks
in Sudan, with the bulk coming from the Heglig and
Unity fields in blocks 1, 2 and 4, with 2,000 b/d production from Block 6 and
5,000 b/d from the Melut Basin fields in Blocks 3 and
7 (MEES, 8 October 2001). The GNPOC
group comprises the China National Petroleum Corporation (40% - operator), Petronas Carigali (30%), Talisman
(25%) and Sudan National Petroleum Company (5%).
Sudan, Ethiopia Demarcate Border, Agree On Oil And Power Links
Sudan and Ethiopia signed an agreement on 11 May demarcating their common
border, Al-Hayat
reported on 12 May. Furthermore, the two countries agreed to link their
power grids and Sudan agreed to allow Ethiopia to use Port
Sudan for all its
import and export requirements and to supply Addis Ababa with crude oil.
Senator Danforth’s Report
Below
is the section of Sen. Danforth’s report dealing
specifically with oil. The full report can be found at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020514-11.html
Both
the discovery of significant oil reserves, especially in the south, and the
advent of serious production in 1999 have reshaped Sudan’s civil war. (Sudan has proven oil reserves of over one billion barrels and
prospects of an additional one to four billion barrels.) No enduring settlement
to Sudan’s war can be achieved unless the oil dimension is
effectively addressed. The SPLM regards oil as a southern endowment that the
government has forcibly exploited to finance a war strategy that relies
increasingly on expensive, highly lethal weapons. For its part, the government
regards oil fields as vulnerable, strategic assets, which it seeks to defend
preemptively through attacks upon southern insurgents and their alleged
civilian supporters. The recent reconciliation between John Garang
and Riak Machar, and Garang’s statements on impending attacks by the SPLA, are
seen by the Sudanese Government as a serious Nuer-Dinka
threat to the oil fields, justifying a military response including attacks on
civilians.
Any
peace process should address the oil issue in order to resolve a major cause of
conflict and to serve as the basis for a just peace. The fair allocation of oil
resources could be the key to working out broader political issues if it were
possible to find a monetary formula for sharing oil revenue between the central
government and the people of the south. It might be possible to find some
formula acceptable to both the SPLM and the GOS for cessation of the current
conflict over the oil fields before a final peace agreement.
International
oil companies and foreign investors capable of making the investment needed to
realize Sudan’s oil potential are more likely to venture into Sudan if there is peace and political stability than in current
circumstances. That fact should serve as a powerful incentive for the Sudanese
Government and the SPLM to reach agreement. Any such arrangements will,
however, require extensive discussion and analysis and will require reliable
mechanisms with international monitoring to guarantee the integrity of whatever
revenue-sharing formula is agreed upon.
Since
shortly after my appointment as Special Envoy, I have urged our government to
draw upon experts in various departments to develop our best thinking on how
the distribution of oil revenues might further the cause of peace in Sudan. Some promising work is being done by non-governmental
organizations to assemble a profile of Sudan’s oil sector and explore revenue-sharing options. I
continue to believe that such a work product would be valuable for
consideration in a peace process.
Copyright © 2002 Middle East
Economic Survey