VOL. XLVI

No 51/52

22/29-December-2003

 

Text Box: Contents Include:   ENERGY (A)   SOMO Floating LPG Storage Plans, 3 Halliburton Charges Concern Bush, 3 Demand Keeps Prices Buoyant, 6 Fresh Azadegan Deadline Passes, 7 Iran Signs Extra IAEA Protocol, 8 Khelil Sees Slow Euro-Med Progress, 10 Algeria Awards Five Blocks, 11 Apache To Develop West Med, 14 New Head For Sytrol, 18 Borouge To Expand Ruwais Plant, 18       FINANCE (B)   Saudi 2004 Budget Sees $8Bn Deficit, 1 Creditors Pledge Iraq Debt Reduction, 5 Qatargas-2 Financing Moving Ahead, 6 Sohar Refinery Loan Signing, 6 Jordan's Samra Financing Deal, 7       POLITICS (C)   Saddam Captured, 1 Sistani Wants UN Vote Decision, 1 Sharon Threatens To Act Unilaterally, 2       OP ED & DOCUMENTS (D)   Meling On Oil Supply Growth, 1    

IRAQ

 

Iraq: What Next?

 

MEES Editor-In-Chief Walid Khadduri presents his assessment of Iraq’s future after the capture of former President Saddam Husain.

 

The capture of Saddam Husain on 13 December marked the end of a dark era in Iraqi history, and in the Arab world for that matter, despite the fact that Saddam’s political demise can be dated back to the fall of Baghdad in April. The issue now is not just how Saddam will be tried and where, but the very future of Iraq – and Iraqi oil – itself.

 

There is no question that after 35 years of a totalitarian regime, three wars, and 13 years of UN sanctions and an occupation, it will take time to bring Iraq back to stability and normalcy. Responsibility for this process lies with many quarters, for the Iraqi question today is an international issue, and no longer merely a local one.

 

Firstly, the US has to end occupation and to accelerate the transfer of sovereignty and authority to the Iraqis. The present situation is an anomaly whose raison d’etre has evaporated with the capture of Saddam. The failure to find weapons of mass destruction has seriously undermined the credibility of the US and the UK, and the presence of US troops in Iraq has brought al-Qa΄ida fighters into the country for the first time. However, the most important reason for the transfer of power is that Iraq is capable of ruling itself. It has been a sovereign state for over 70 years, and the fact that it was ruled by a dictator does not mean that it lacks the will and ability to rule itself. The more this fact is questioned, the more difficult it becomes for all concerned. Before Saddam’s capture, the plan was to hand sovereignty back to the Iraqis next June. Iraqis are now hoping that the transfer will be accelerated, for the sooner this happens the better. Crucial to the whole process is how to transfer authority to the Iraqis and to whom.

 

As for the neo-conservatives’ idea that Iraq should serve as a model for democratic change throughout the Middle East, experience so far indicates that it will be a long time before this happens. Moreover, and more important, democratic reform is a matter for the people of each country to decide and cannot be imposed through foreign occupation. The fear among Iraqis is that the neo-conservatives will seek to exploit US presence in Iraq and Iraqi resources to interfere in neighboring countries with a view to ensuring Israel’s security. Such a policy would only contribute to the instability of Iraq and hinder the reconciliation process.

 

Secondly, the five permanent members of the Security Council need to narrow their differences and work together again to find a common solution to the Iraqi question. For almost a decade, there has not been a clear Security Council policy on how to deal with Iraq. There have been major differences over sanctions, disarmament, compensation, the invasion and the occupation. This lack of consensus on all the main issues, reflecting different national interests and divergent views on international affairs, has only served to complicate the Iraqi question. Many issues need to be debated and decided in the weeks and months to come, not least the role of the UN in the transfer of power to the Iraqis, debt and compensation relief, the recovery program and the trial of Saddam.

 

Thirdly, there is the question of reconciliation among the Iraqis themselves. There has been talk – mainly in foreign media and institutions – about the break-up of Iraq into three states. This is not an option for the Iraqis. The task facing the Iraqis today is how to achieve reconciliation after decades of dictatorial rule. The Iraqi experience is different from South Africa in that the country is not divided along clear racial lines. It is also different from that of Yugoslavia because ethnic, historical and geographical divisions are not as solid. Iraq is a mosaic of different religions, ethnic groups and minorities. Reconciliation, in the Iraqi context, is political in nature and involves groups that have much in common. Restructuring Iraq along confessional lines, as in Lebanon, is abhorrent to most Iraqis. To allow one group to go on dominating all the rest is also not acceptable. What is needed in the country today is a new social contract that encompasses the various political groups and excludes none. While there is unanimous support among the population for the trial of those who committed crimes against humanity and their fellow citizens, there is also considerable opposition to the policy of de-Ba'athification – as there was to the dissolution of the army, police and other national institutions. The sooner this divisive issue is resolved, the sooner Iraq can set on the road to recovery, democracy and federation.

 

As for the role of Iraq in the world oil industry, in the immediate future, the possible resumption of exports of Kirkuk crude may create nervousness in world oil markets, especially if it takes place in the next few weeks – just before deliveries to second quarter 2004. Accordingly, Iraqi oil production is expected to hover around 2.0-2.5mn b/d in 2004 depending on the availability of Kirkuk exports, and approximately 2.5-3.0mn b/d in 2005 based on the ability of the oil authorities to bring into production some 300,000 b/d of new streams of crude from incompletely developed fields. As for the long term, experience so far indicates that to increase Iraqi oil production capacity from 3mn b/d to 5mn b/d will take time and billions of dollars, and can only be done gradually during the second half of the decade – provided security prevails. A great deal of work needs to be done to rehabilitate upstream, midstream and downstream facilities, and extensive preparation and negotiations on both the Iraqi level and with international oil companies has to take place before the country’s production capacity can be substantially increased.  

 

Finally, a postscript on Saddam. One of the Iraqi leaders who met with him on 14 December told MEES that he was struck by two of the former president’s characteristics. First, despite having been captured in humiliating circumstances he was his normal arrogant self, not conceding or regretting anything. Second, he appeared to be living in a time warp, consumed with the ideas and ideals of the 1960s and 70s, failing to recognize that the world had changed around him, and refusing to listen to the few who dared to tell him otherwise. This may go some way towards explaining why Iraq took the disastrous course that it did in the recent decades and why it is where it is now.